

## Application form

Information to be filled out by the Commission			
Fund/Instrument	Specific Objective	Specific Action	Reference of the call
<b>BMVI</b>	<b>SO1</b>	<b>BMVI/2024/SA/1.4.2</b>	Enhancing border surveillance capabilities for countries at the borders with Russia and Belarus

*N.B. This application form is composed of a non-exhaustive list of information required by the Commission services to assess an application. Please note that:*

- *for the assessment, additional information may be requested if needed.*
- *In the absence of a specific indication of the aspects in the application that you consider sensitive, the information provided will **not** be handled, in principle, as “sensitive non-classified information” in the meaning of Article 9(5)(b) of Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/443 of 13 March 2015 on Security in the Commission<sup>1</sup>*
- *Any document held by the Commission, including documents containing sensitive information, **may be subject to a request for public access to documents** and must be assessed pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents<sup>2</sup> in light of the factual and legal circumstances that apply at the time of the adoption of the decision on access.*

### Part1. Administrative information

A) General information		
<b>Country</b>	<b>National Specific Action</b> (Indicate your country)	Finland
	<b>Transnational Specific Action</b> (Indicate the participating country)	n/a
<b>Title of the proposal</b> <i>(please do <b>not</b> include any information that you consider not</i>	Enhancing border surveillance capabilities at Finland's eastern border	

<sup>1</sup> OJ L 72 of 17.03.2015, p. 41.

<sup>2</sup> OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43.

<i>suitable for release to the public)</i>	
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<b>B) Participants and contacts</b>	
<b>Identity of the (lead) Managing Authority</b>	<b>Full legal name of the Managing Authority (in English)</b>
	Ministry of the Interior
	<b>Legal representative of the Managing Authority</b>
	<u>Title/First Name/Last Name:</u> Laura Yli-Vakkuri
	<u>Position:</u> Director General for International Affairs

<b>Contact details of the person(s) responsible for the specific action within the Managing Authority</b>	<u>Title/First Name/Last Name</u> Riika Väliähde
	<u>Position:</u> Senior Specialist
	<u>Direct telephone + country code number :</u> +358 50 456 1599
	<u>E-mail :</u> riika.valiahde@gov.fi
<b>Project Beneficiaries</b>  List all the project beneficiaries	<u>Lead project beneficiary :</u> The Finnish Border Guard (FBG)
	<u>Other project beneficiaries :</u> n/a
<b>Exchange of information between the Managing Authority and the project beneficiaries</b>	Any proposal selected will have to be implemented in accordance with the EU and national rules, and the national, management and control system of the country concerned.
	<u>Has the Managing Authority exchanged information with the project beneficiaries about the conditions under the country's programme to ensure compliance with these rules?</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
	Comments (any outstanding issues or issues to be addressed after selection, if applicable):
	<u>Do all partners agree on all the legal and financial obligations in implementing this proposal?</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No

	Comments :
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**Part 2. Presentation of the proposal**

**Project description**

**Provide a baseline description of the situation at the external border relevant to your application, supported by reliable data (sourced statistics). Provide an overview of the current situation as well as a substantiated forecast of possible developments in the short and medium term, including but not limited to:**

- Percentage of the border covered by stationary/mobile surveillance systems
- Description of border surveillance tasks at the border section/s concerned and the reasons for the tasks
- Nature of the terrain etc.
- Existing challenges (shortcomings)

The baseline description should include the narrative and an annex with a table listing relevant initiatives and projects aimed at enhancing the border capabilities, which your proposal will build upon. Please also include a map demonstrating where the pressure lies and where projects/ actions have been undertaken and will be deployed under this specific action.

NB: please keep in mind that some information may be classified and thus should not be included in this application form. If this is the case, please provide a simplified description and reference to relevant documents (i.e. Vulnerability Assessment).

Finland is responsible for securing the longest 1 343,6 km EU land border section with Russia. It is stated in the latest Schengen evaluation carried out in 2023 that in Finland *the quality of the land border surveillance is good, but highly dependent on the operational situation at the land border with Russia. The existing capacities are sufficient only if the situation does not change as the financing for maintenance and running costs are not guaranteed and the acquisition of additional stationary and mobile means, as well as adequate increase in the number of staff are not assured.*

Percentage of the border covered by stationary/mobile surveillance systems

Percentage of the border covered by stationary / mobile surveillance systems is not public information. In practice, most of the external sea border and the most important parts of the external land border of Finland are covered by technical surveillance systems.

The hours of technical control have increased significantly during the past five years (table 1) and the main emphasis is clearly on mobile surveillance systems such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and tactical surveillance cameras, which the FBG has approx. 1500 along the eastern land border and that can be easily moved from a location to another based on the risk analysis. In 2023 the amount of fixed surveillance systems was only 6% out of all technical control hours.

The means used in technical surveillance are cameras, motion detection, radar detection, monitoring ground vibration and pattern recognition controlled by artificial intelligence.

## TECHNICAL CONTROL, HOURS

Year	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Other technical surveillance	32,441	33,341	31,918	39,055	41,173
Mobile surveillance system	1,643,914	2,905,759	3,348,902	3,856,010	4,748,805
Fixed surveillance system	322,240	322,127	318,715	356,972	346,622
Radar surveillance	275,764	298,347	288,550	288,802	296,829
Optical surveillance	294,171	310,990	306,206	318,307	328,578
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,568,530</b>	<b>3,870,564</b>	<b>4,294,291</b>	<b>4,859,146</b>	<b>5,762,007</b>

Table 1: Finnish Border Guard's Annual Report 2023

### Description of border surveillance tasks at the border section/s concerned and the reasons for the tasks

The border control at the external land and sea borders is based on the risk analysis carried out at all levels of the Finnish Border Guard's organization. The core of the surveillance system are the patrols with good mobility and adequate equipment e.g. night vision devices and dogs. The patrols are responsible for monitoring activities possessing the command, control and operational capabilities required for multi-sectoral operations involving public authorities and the national defence.

The patrols are supported by fixed and mobile technical surveillance systems, as well as aircraft and surface vessel equipment at the maritime areas. As seen in the Table 2, patrolling on foot or using different vehicles has the key role when looking at the total of patrolling hours. Using Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) has also increased significantly during the past five years.

## PATROLLING, HOURS

Year	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Joint patrols	3,131	933	1,880	1,842	1,413
UAS patrolling*	302	335	423	1,347	2,550
Foreigner control**				2,137	3,587
Boat, hydrocopter and hovercraft	23,372	23,726	23,624	26,737	25,687
Patrol vessel	18,097	18,255	18,461	20,099	20,305
Aeroplane	594	618	624	598	565
Helicopter	806	631	448	723	1,436
On foot, motorcycle, snowmobile, car (etc.); dog	83,225	96,988	77,865	77,139	71,592
On foot, motorcycle, snowmobile, car (etc.)	131,386	222,667	215,192	163,089	185,853
<b>Total</b>	<b>260,914</b>	<b>364,153</b>	<b>338,518</b>	<b>293,711</b>	<b>312,988</b>

\*) UAS = Unmanned Aerial System

\*\*\*) New surveillance target

Table 2: Finnish Border Guard's Annual Report 2023

Around 2000 persons work as border guards at either land or sea borders. To support their tasks the FBG has about 560 operational and administrative vehicles, more than 500 snowmobiles and all-terrain vehicles (ATV) and approximately 200 dogs to be used for operational tasks.

### Nature of the terrain

The eastern land border is surrounded by varying conditions. Vast forests, hills and the lack of supporting infrastructure such as roads are characteristic of the terrain. Approximately 20% of the border runs in lakes, rivers and marine areas. Another determining feature is the arctic operating environment since a significant part of the eastern land border is north of the Arctic circle. This is a crucial fact to consider while determining the means and operational requirements for technical solutions and systems used.

### Existing challenges

During the past year, the phenomenon of instrumentalised illegal migration has been the most significant challenge to be addressed by the Finnish Border Guard and other authorities responsible for the implementation of the Schengen acquis.

The first signs were noticed already in late July 2023 and they intensified significantly during the autumn. At the beginning of November, the number of persons arriving and seeking for international protection grew significantly and it became more evident that they were assisted. One visible sign was that they arrived riding bicycles, because it is not allowed to cross the border on foot. As the phenomenon accelerated, the Finnish Government decided to restrict the border crossing traffic and eventually to close the border crossing points.

In November 2023, the Finnish Government decided to temporarily close four BCPs (Vaalimaa, Nuijamaa, Imatra and Niirala) and centralize asylum applications to two BCPs (Vartius and Salla). The rest of the eastern land border BCPs (Kuusamo, Raja-Jooseppi and Vainikkala) remained open, but it was not possible to apply for international protection at the BCPs. The first decision entered into force on 18 November 2023, but it did not stop the phenomenon. From 24 November 2023, three more BCPs were closed (Kuusamo, Vartius and Salla). Raja-Jooseppi remained the only BCP at the eastern land border to apply for international protection.

As the phenomenon still continued, the Government decided to close Raja-Jooseppi BCP as well and to centralize the application of international protection to air and sea border crossing points from 30 November to 13 December 2023. The phenomenon was temporarily halted. When the Government decided to reopen two BCPs (Vaalimaa and Niirala) on 14 December and make it possible to apply for international protection, the phenomenon continued immediately. The Government decided on the same day to close all the eastern land border BCPs for one month starting from 15 December. The closure was later extended until 11 February 2024 and again till 14 April 2024. Finally, the Government decided to extend the closure of the border until further notice, but no longer than necessary.

Based on information gathered by the FBG and other authorities, it is very likely that the phenomenon was to continue if the BCPs were reopened for border crossing traffic. During the spring and summer months, illegal migrants have been caught crossing the border from other locations than BCPs. Therefore, the phenomenon is considered ongoing.

The situation at the border between Finland and Russia is unpredictable and therefore the Finnish authorities must ensure constant readiness and sufficient response capabilities. Russia's hybrid influence activities may resume and possibly even expand. Finland's most important challenge is maintaining the high performance of the border control system, while austerity measures are being implemented in the public economy, the international predictability of the illegal immigration flow has weakened and the threat of instrumentalisation of illegal immigration has increased.

Existing deficiencies are classified information and can be accessed through various documents such as Vulnerability Assessment, Schengen evaluation report (2023) and national risk analysis.

In general, it can be stated that the deficiencies have to do with the length of the eastern border and its challenging features and environment. One significant challenge is the modest cover of technical surveillance when considering the border to be secured and the difficulties in increasing the amount of fixed technical surveillance because of the challenging environment. Due to recent events, including hybrid attacks such as the instrumentalised illegal migration and GPS interferences it has become evident that in regards to security Finland is facing external governmental actors. A varying selection of different surveillance means, overlapping and interlaced, working simultaneously are needed.

The vulnerable locations of the eastern border are classified information. Therefore a map demonstrating the exact pressured spots or the locations of the proposed activities cannot be included in this proposal. In general, the border crossing points and their surroundings are estimated to be the most vulnerable since they are easily accessible through roads, and other critical infrastructure exists and is maintained. The technical border surveillance in these areas has already been improved significantly and the ongoing strategic project of building a fixed border installation will continue to improve the security and surveillance. This proposal aims to improve the technical surveillance in particular in the vulnerable areas between the BCPs, outside their surroundings.

The actions of the proposal affect Finland's eastern border including the land and sea areas of the border. A comprehensive map of the border sections and the BCPs can be found in the Vulnerability assessment of 2024.

**Provide a short summary of the proposal (max ½ page) that presents clearly and briefly what you intend to do, and what you expect the concrete results to be once the project is finalised.**

*(please do **not** include any information in this summary that you consider not suitable for release to the public)*

The general objective of the proposal is to strengthen Finland's border surveillance capabilities in a changed security environment to respond to the hybrid threats and the instrumentalisation of migrants by Russia. The proposal aims to improve the situational awareness and to prohibit illegal border crossings and refugee floods by creating new capabilities of border surveillance, improving data transfer and data transmission solutions, extending the coverage of the technical surveillance and securing the mobility of the patrols.

A totally new capability is created by building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure which basically means a network of sensors based on actual sensors and analysis systems. A Line of Sight Datalink network of base stations is created in order to improve data communication connections, which are needed due to the new surveillance technology (including ESM, UAS). New operating environment with a lot of GPS interference requires having GNSS (global navigation satellite system) independent systems and positioning devices. Mobile surveillance capabilities are extended and developed by procuring new kinds of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and by maintaining the achieved level of the existing UAS fleet. Besides technical solutions, patrolling is a key element of the border surveillance system. The mobility of the patrols is essential and it is achieved by using safe, dependable and modern vehicles suitable for varying environment and circumstances that Finland's eastern border holds.

The proposal therefore includes the purchase of patrol cars, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and snowmobiles to reinforce and complement the main activities.

As a result of the activities the intelligence capabilities and the situational awareness are improved significantly at Finland's eastern border, which contributes to the national and eventually to the European situational picture. Risk analysis can be carried out on the basis of high-quality and reliable information and resources can be allocated efficiently. The surveillance of the external border is efficient and comprehensive.

**Provide a description of the proposal including (max 3 pages):**

- a) the general objectives of the proposal;
- b) the actors and countries involved;
- c) the activities carried out under the proposal;
- d) the challenges addressed and
- e) the expected (quantified) results

**a) the general objectives of the proposal;**

The general objective of the proposal is to strengthen Finland's border surveillance capabilities in a changed security environment to respond to the hybrid threats and the instrumentalisation of migrants by Russia. The proposal aims to improve the situational awareness and to prohibit illegal border crossings and refugee floods by creating new capabilities of border surveillance, improving data transfer and data transmission, extending the coverage of the technical surveillance and securing the mobility of the patrols.

The core of the proposal is the improvement of the intelligence capabilities and the situational awareness, which bring necessary information to be used for the risk analysis. The risk analysis forms the basis for the efficient and appropriate allocation of resources.

**b) the actors and countries involved;**

The project and its work packages will be implemented by the Finnish Border Guard, no other countries or actors are involved.

**c) the activities carried out under the proposal;**

The proposal consists of all three activities of strategic importance referred to in the call for expression of interest:

- The extension or upgrading of existing border surveillance systems, involving procurement of fixed and/or mobile equipment catering for increased surveillance of EU external land borders;
- The introduction of means of surveillance entailing new forms of technology, complementing existing infrastructure and systems; and
- Support for upgrades or new communication systems that improve the quality of data transfer & transmission and/or ensure the integration of information of new systems or means of surveillance into the overall information management/situational awareness.

In addition, the proposal includes the purchase of means of transport to support the main activities.

The proposed activities are divided into four work packages in order of priority.

### **WP1: Building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure**

The goal is to create an entirely new capability for the FBG by building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure to enhance border surveillance. ESM infrastructure will include also Counter-UAS features (detection).

ESM refers to the detection, recognition, localization, identification and monitoring of radio-frequency electromagnetic waves and radio equipment using a technical device other than radar using the properties of electromagnetic waves. In order to work, ESM requires an electromagnetic support measurement infrastructure which basically means a network of sensors based on the actual sensors and analysis systems.

Under WP1 the FBG defines the target state for the ESM capability (incl. CUAS detection features), prepares its implementation, makes plans for tests, implements market research and data acquisition, evaluations of systems and sensors, defines requirements, prepares and implements procurements, takes care of system commissioning and personnel training. FBG will also carry out a market research about GNSS-independent systems and positioning devices and procures the products in question.

### **WP2: Data transfer and data transmission solutions for the border infrastructure, enabling and improving situational picture and management of border security**

A Line of Sight Datalink network of base stations is created in order to improve data communication connections, which are needed for the use of the new surveillance technology (including ESM and UAS). New operating environment with a lot of GPS interference requires the FBG to have GNSS (global navigation satellite system) independent systems and positioning devices, which will also be procured in the project.

Funding is used to procure radios and base stations to improve transferring data. There is need for two kind of base stations:

- base stations for line of sight datalink network that is used with aircrafts and vessels,
  - mobile base stations that can be used locally to strengthen the public safety network Virve 2.0.
- In addition, funds will be used for the development of a new data processing environment.

With these actions the FBG could improve the quality of data transfer and data transmission and ensure the integration of information.

### **WP3: Unmanned Aerial Systems**

The goal is to improve the coverage of technical surveillance at the EU external land and sea border which contribute to the situational awareness. The proposed activity includes the

procurement of new unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in order to develop the FBG's operational capability and to maintain the achieved level of the UAS.

This Work Package will be divided into four separate activities.

The first activity includes a market research and procuring of new UAS performances.

The second activity consists of procuring about 20-30 level I2 (2-10 kg) Unmanned Aerial Systems with necessary equipment. The third activity consists of maintaining the achieved level of I1 and I2 UAS fleet by implementing procurements of systems and spare parts. Fourth activity consists of procuring electronic CUAS devices, for example handheld UAS-jammers.

#### **Additional activity: Operational mobility**

In addition to the surveillance technology, patrolling forms a key element of the border surveillance system. The mobility of the patrols is essential and it is achieved by using safe, dependable and modern vehicles suitable for varying environment and circumstances that Finland's eastern border holds. The proposal therefore includes the purchase of patrol cars, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and snowmobiles.

#### **d) the challenges addressed**

It is stated in the national IBM strategy that the development of round-the-clock border surveillance detection and identification capabilities in all weather conditions is extremely important. Due to the challenging and variable terrain conditions and inadequate infrastructure, it is not possible to cover the entire border between Finland and Russia with fixed surveillance technology. Therefore, it is critical to introduce new kinds of surveillance means and develop the existing mobile technical surveillance as well.

The Border Guard Act (578/2005) was changed only in June 2024 enabling the FBG to execute radio-technical monitoring. The FBG did not previously have the authority to use such technology, but the new legislation makes this possible. The new capability can provide advance information about unauthorized movement in the border area, which can be used to target other means of surveillance at the area in question. Unauthorized UAS-activities can be detected and located. It is therefore important to make use of the technology that the Border Guard has been authorised to use. The FBG will be able to perform its border surveillance duties effectively and safely even in an environment where GPS/GNSS interference is constantly present.

At the moment the FBG does not have sufficiently reliable and high-performance data transmission solutions for transmitting real-time data. As a result, the data produced by surveillance systems cannot be utilized in an optimal way. Data is also processed in several different data processing environments, which weakens the usability of the data and exposes it to vulnerabilities. In order to be able to transfer and process the data properly from the point of view of cyber security a new data processing environment (so-called 'surveillance network') needs to be developed. Surveillance network requires e.g. procurement of encryption and firewall solutions and workstation services from a selected partner and integration of current decentralized services into a part of the network. There are also gaps in the coverage of the

public safety network Virve 2.0 that is the Finnish authorities' telecommunications network and widely used by the patrols. Movable base stations would be needed to secure the connections locally.

Therefore, mobile technical surveillance is in a significant role when considering the border surveillance means as a whole. The UAS have been in operational use for six years and their use has increased significantly during the past five years. The features develop at a fast pace. The number of existing UAS used by the FBG is rather modest considering the length of the eastern border. The life cycle of the UAS in rough conditions has proven to be short. The existing system and devices need to be updated/replaced with new ones regularly, but there is also a need to increase the volume of the UAS surveillance by increasing the number of UAS. The level of mobile surveillance in the areas not covered by fixed technical surveillance needs to be substantially increased, new and improved UAS solutions introduced and the level of acquired fleet maintained.

According to the Schengen evaluation 2023 the total number of patrol vehicles especially in South-East Border Guard District is at an insufficient level. In other words, the old cars should be replaced with new improved ones, but the total number of vehicles should also be increased. Even though the operational mobility has been improved during the past years by renewing the patrol vehicles regularly and based on careful planning, the number of patrol vehicles is not sufficient for operating in a changed security situation. When the phenomenon of instrumentalised illegal immigration started in autumn 2023 and led to the appointment of additional staff, a significant number of vehicles had to be rented in order to transport staff and execute patrolling actions.

Border surveillance as a whole does not function without patrolling. The information provided by fixed and mobile technical surveillance is crucial in determining risks, but they cannot carry out the actual actions required at the border. That is why mobile patrols are vital and necessary for example for the operation of the UAS which are one of the patrols' most important tools. In addition, most vehicles in use are only for four persons, even though the security situation requires reinforcing patrols.

#### **e) the expected (quantified) results**

##### **WP1: Building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure**

The ESM capability provides a new tool for monitoring large wilderness areas efficiently. It creates a more accurate ability than radar surveillance to detect, locate, identify and track radio-frequency electromagnetic waves and radio equipment, and a real-time situational picture can be formed regardless of GNSS interference. The need for manpower for border patrols and surveillance flights will be reduced.

Because the ESM capability will be partially fixed, partially mobile and transferable, and the planning and defining the target state is still in its infancy, it is not possible to define the coverage of the ESM and the sensors belonging to it at this stage.

**WP2: Data transfer and data transmission solutions for the border infrastructure, enabling and improving situational picture and management of border security**

The Datalink radio system will give a significant improvement in aircrafts’/vessels’ data transfer rates, which is essential for the use of modern sensors. The expected coverage of the Datalink is 100% of the border. Movable base stations will complement the gaps in the coverage of the radio network used by patrols.

**WP3: Unmanned Aerial Systems**

The expected outcome of acquiring new level I2 systems and maintaining the UAS fleet is to increase substantially the coverage of mobile technical border surveillance. The target number of level I2 UAS to be purchased is 20-30, while the whole maintained fleet consists of almost 200 UAS. The coverage of the fixed technical surveillance of the Finnish-Russian land border is approx. 15% of the border length, and the level of mobile surveillance in the rest of 85% of the land border length will be substantially increased. UAS countermeasures capabilities will be improved.

**Operational mobility**

24 vehicles, 18 ATVs and 34 snowmobiles to be used in Lapland, North Karelia, Kainuu and Southeast Finland border guard districts will be procured.

The border guard districts currently have 53 vehicles that are not considered reliable for patrols due to their age or accumulated kilometres. Around 45% of the vehicles waiting to be taken off from the patrolling use will be replaced.

The procured vehicles will be registered in the Frontex Technical Equipment Pool when allocated to operations as agreed with the Agency in the Annual Bilateral Negotiations.

**If relevant, please provide information on the Schengen recommendations and references to the vulnerability assessment in relation to the current situation at the external border.** Please keep in mind that vulnerability assessments are confidential and only references to its content (to be checked by the Commission services) should be made in this application form.

It is stated in the Annex 2 (public) of the Commission Implementing Decision establishing the report of the 2023 Schengen evaluation of Finland that the first priority is to strengthen the land border surveillance, by guaranteeing a sufficient number of trained staff as well as an effective implementation of the state-of-the-art technologies, considering the volatile operational environment at the land border with Russia.

In this proposal new technologies and surveillance capabilities are introduced as well as improving and increasing the existing surveillance technologies which guarantee the efficient use of limited human resources.

One of the prioritized recommendations is to “guarantee the necessary funding for the development of the border surveillance capabilities at the land borders (acquisition of additional

equipment, modernisation of equipment and infrastructure, maintenance, running costs, swift and rapid construction of technical surveillance obstacle) in accordance with national capability development planning processes”. A significant deficit has to do with the insufficient number of operational vehicles.

The latest Schengen evaluation concerning Finland was carried out in 2023 and the implementing decision was received in July 2024. Finland has only recently drawn up the action plan to implement the recommendations. It is not possible to address the recommendations using the initial allocation from Finland’s BMVI programme since Finland has launched the implementation of the programme effectively and the initial allocation is already committed to projects.

**If your application includes work packages, please indicate the priority of each work package in relation to its relevance with regards to the capability gaps, as well as the expected timeline for delivery.**

The application includes four work packages, which are prioritized in the following order:  
 WP1: Building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure  
 WP2: Data transfer and data transmission solutions for the border infrastructure, enabling and improving situational picture and management of border security  
 WP3: Unmanned Aerial Systems  
 Additional activity: Operational mobility

*Only for a transnational proposal*

**Describe the arrangements agreed by the participating countries**  
 (You are invited to explain the general rationale for the arrangements of the partnership; the envisaged division of tasks between participating entities, indicative timetable, distribution of the funding between participating entities, organisation of financial management among the participating entities, linguistic regime and reporting, monitoring, control and audit arrangements)

n/a

<b>Is the EU funding for the specific action to be allocated to :</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Option 1:</b> The programme of the lead country in its entirety?
	<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Option 2:</b> The programme of each partner country?

**Application/Work package 1: Building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure**

*Copy as needed per work packages*

**Title of the work package (if applicable): Building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure**

**Beneficiary/  
Co-beneficiary:  
  
FBG**

**Please provide further information on the scope of the application or alternatively work package 1. In the event of multiple work packages, describe in more detail the coherence with the proposal as a whole.**

Building a completely new Electromagnetic Support Measurement (ESM) sensors network at the eastern border, including the eastern maritime border, to create an electromagnetic surveillance infrastructure based on sensors and analysis systems. In the current situation at the eastern border and maritime area, this proposed capacity would be essential for getting early warning of activities related to instrumentalised entry at the border areas. In addition, this new technology could be used to detect and geolocate UAS's (unmanned aerial systems). This is a capability that will be a crucial element, when building a border surveillance system fit for current and future challenges. It will extend existing border surveillance systems, involving procurement of fixed, portable and mobile sensors for increased surveillance of EU external border. These systems introduce means of surveillance which are totally new forms of technology for the FBG complementing existing infrastructure and systems.

Building this new system would also require upgrade to relevant equipment. For instance, radio frequency surveillance sensors would need to be mounted to the two border surveillance aircrafts, 12 helicopters and to three OPVs (off-shore patrol vessel) and to some other smaller vessels. Border patrols would also need relevant vehicle based and portable radio frequency sensors to be able to benefit from the system.

As a part of this package, systems and positioning devices that tolerate GNSS interference are investigated and procured for helicopters, vessels and other systems.

Execution of the project is possible to launch from 2025. Procurement is underway from 2025 to 2029. The objective is planned to be reached in 2029.

Funding can be distributed in 2025 – 2027, emphasis being in 2025 and 2026

<b>No</b>	<p><b>Describe each piece of large equipment, or group of equipment, means or system and include where and how the equipment will be used (purpose and scope). Please explain where appropriate the quantity of the equipment needed and add a reference to the excel sheet.</b></p>
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1.1	Consulting service costs in the project for defining the objective/target setting, preparing the implementation plan and preparing test plans.	
1.2	Costs of market research, system and sensor evaluations and tests in the project.	
1.3	Costs of ESM system and sensor procurements, implementation and personnel training for the FBG. ESM-systems (incl. CUAS detection) and sensors will most likely be procured of several different types (fixed, portable and mobile) nationally for the eastern land border and maritime border, also for aircrafts and vessels.	
1.4	Costs of GNSS-independent systems and positioning devices	
Expected quantifiable deliverables and concrete results (degree to which it would improve the effectiveness of border management) of the different budget items / activities under this work package (in terms of timeline).		
1.1	1.1 Target setting document, Implementation plan, Test plans.	
1.2	1.2 Several system and sensor evaluations	
1.3	1.3 Several types of ESM (and CUAS detection) systems and sensors, multiple of each for different platforms (fixed, portable, mobile)	
...	1.4 Several systems and positioning devices that tolerate GNSS interference for different platforms	
<p><b><i>Application/Work package 2: Data transfer and data transmission solutions for the border infrastructure, enabling and improving situational picture and management of border security</i></b></p> <p><i>Copy as needed per work packages</i></p>		
<p><b>Title of the work package (if applicable): Data transfer and data transmission solutions for the border infrastructure, enabling and improving situational picture and management of border security</b></p>		<p><b>Beneficiary/ Co-beneficiary:</b> <b>FBG</b></p>
<p><b>Please provide further information on the scope of the application or alternatively work package 2. In the event of multiple work packages, describe in more detail the coherence with the proposal as a whole.</b></p>		
<p>Building a datalink radio system for the use of FBG’s border surveillance planes, helicopters and three OPVs (off-shore patrol vessel). Datalink network solution would enable transmission of real time data from different kinds of sensors and thus enhance the situational awareness. The acquisition requires frequency license from Finnish Transport and Communication Agency. If</p>		

the license is denied it is possible to build the solution with the commercial low earth orbit (LEO) -satellite systems.

Purchasing mobile base stations for the public safety network Virve 2.0 would improve connections in the wilderness areas. They would also support the establishment of temporary priority areas.

In addition to the datalink network solution, there is a need to develop a new data processing environment (so-called ‘surveillance network’) for cyber-secure data transfer and processing of FBG’s surveillance data. Surveillance network requires e.g. procurement of encryption and firewall solutions and workstation services from a selected partner and integration of current decentralized services into a part of the network.

No	<b>Describe each piece of large equipment, or group of equipment, means or system and include where and how the equipment will be used (purpose and scope). Please explain where appropriate the quantity of the equipment needed and add a reference to the excel sheet.</b>	
1.1	Approx. 24 base stations of the radio network. In addition to radio and antenna purchases, the cost of setting up a base station includes the implementation of fixed communication connections, as well as costs related to masts.	
1.2	Radio and antenna procurement to OPV’s and helicopters (15 pcs)	
1.3	Data processing environment for FBG’s surveillance data (‘surveillance network’).  The project requires expert work and e.g. procurement of servers, switches, encryption devices and workstations.	
1.4	Approx. 12 mobile base stations for the public safety network Virve 2.0	
Expected quantifiable deliverables and concrete results (degree to which it would improve the effectiveness of border management) of the different budget items / activities under this work package (in terms of timeline).		
1.1	1.1. Approx. 24 base stations. 100% coverage for radios.	
1.2	1.2. 15 radio systems for FBG’s vessels. Allows transmitting data at the entire sea border.	
	1.3. Data processing environment	

1.3	1.4.Approx. 12 mobile Virve 2.0 base stations
...	

**Application/Work package 3: Unmanned Aerial Systems**  
*Copy as needed per work packages*

<b>Title of the work package (if applicable): Unmanned Aerial Systems</b>	<b>Beneficiary/ Co- beneficiary:  FBG</b>
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**Please provide further information on the scope of the application or alternatively work package 3. In the event of multiple work packages, describe in more detail the coherence with the proposal as a whole.**

This Work Package will be divided into four separate activities.

The first section consists of market research and procuring of new UAS performances. This section might include field tests.

The second section consists of procuring approximately 20-30 level I2 (2-10 kg) Unmanned Aerial Systems with necessary equipment within the scope of procurement contract the Finnish Border Guard has already agreed as the result of a restricted tendering process implemented in 2024 (RVLdno-2023-1992/Unmanned Aircraft Systems I2 (2 – 10 kg)).

The third section consists of maintaining the achieved level of I1 (250g-2kg) and I2 UAS fleet by implementing procurements of systems and spare parts.

The Fourth section consists of purchasing electronic CUAS devices (handheld jammers etc.)

<b>No</b>	<b>Describe each piece of large equipment, or group of equipment, means or system and include where and how the equipment will be used (purpose and scope). Please explain where appropriate the quantity of the equipment needed and add a reference to the excel sheet.</b>	
1.1	Market research and procuring of new UAS performances (i.e. micro-UAS's	
1.2	Procuring 20-30 level I2 (2-10kg) UAS's	
1.3	Maintaining the achieved level of I1 and I2 UAS fleet by implementing procurements of systems and spare parts during 2025-2027	
1.4	Procuring electronic CUAS devices (handheld jammers etc.)	

<p>Expected quantifiable deliverables and concrete results (degree to which it would improve the effectiveness of border management) of the different budget items / activities under this work package (in terms of timeline).</p>		
1.1	1.1 Since UAS's are rapidly developing field of technology, countermeasures are also to be developed at the same pace. The Finnish Border Guard has already procured CUAS capabilities, but it is recognized that the development of these capabilities is also necessary.	
1.2	1.2 Finnish Border Guard patrols would get mobile land and sea border surveillance capability from air and improve situational awareness substantially. With the tactical radius of over 10 kilometres with each UAS the calculative coverage of the procured systems will be over 300 kilometres.	
1.3	1.3 The UAS's fleet shall be maintained at the defined level. The Finnish Border Guard UAS fleet consists of almost 200 UAS's. Desired level to be purchased annually is approx. 30-50 level I1 UAS's and 3-5 level I2 UAS's which are at the end of their life cycle or are lost in operational use.	
...	1.4 The Finnish Border Guard continues to seek even better UAS's capabilities to suit operational needs. This will be executed by market research, field testing and procuring new performances.	
<p><b><i>Application/Additional activity: Operational mobility</i></b></p> <p><i>Copy as needed per work packages</i></p>		
<p><b>Title of the work package (if applicable): Operational mobility</b></p>		<p><b>Beneficiary/ Co- beneficiary:  FBG</b></p>
<p><b>Please provide further information on the scope of the application or alternatively work package. In the event of multiple work packages, describe in more detail the coherence with the proposal as a whole.</b></p>		
<p>Mobile patrols carry out surveillance actions and use versatile tools such as vehicles, dogs and UAS' in their everyday tasks. The formation of dependable and up to date situational picture is vital in order to allocate the mobile patrols efficiently.</p> <p>To secure the mobility of the patrols the FBG will procure 24 new patrol cars, 18 ATVs and 34 snowmobiles which will be placed at the disposal of the four border guard districts operating in eastern border. The life cycle of the vehicles is quite short and new equipment are procured every year.</p>		
<b>No</b>	<p><b>Describe each piece of large equipment, or group of equipment, means or system and include where and how the equipment will be used (purpose and scope).</b></p>	

	<b>Please explain where appropriate the quantity of the equipment needed and add a reference to the excel sheet.</b>	
1.1	Patrol vehicles used at the eastern land border	
1.2	All-terrain vehicles used at the eastern land border	
1.3	Snowmobiles used at the eastern land border	
Expected quantifiable deliverables and concrete results (degree to which it would improve the effectiveness of border management) of the different budget items / activities under this work package (in terms of timeline).		
1.1	1.1 24 patrol vehicles 1.2 18 ATVs 1.3 34 snowmobiles ...	
1.2		
1.3		
...		

**A) Relevance of the proposal**

<p><b>1. Consistency of the proposal with the challenges identified at the border section</b></p> <p>Provide an analysis based on one or more of the following elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. completely or partially missing surveillance means in a given border section, where the new solution would be essential for more efficient management of external borders, showing that there are no obstacles to achieve the objectives (e.g., the terrain conditions allow for it);</li><li>b. surveillance means in place, but outdated and would benefit from update, upgrade or extension;</li><li>c. data on the volume and nature of the irregular crossings of migrants and where available credible intelligence on future developments;</li><li>d. how the proposed means addressed recommendations of the Schengen Evaluation and/or Vulnerability Assessment;</li></ul>	<p>The activities introduced in the proposal are considered best suitable to respond to the challenges identified at Finland’s eastern border and they will enhance the border surveillance cutting through many layers of the system. New technologies and surveillance capabilities, such as the ESM, are introduced but also the existing surveillance technologies are being improved and increased (UAS).</p> <p>The core of the proposal is to improve surveillance means and their coverage in border sections, where surveillance technology is insufficient or missing. The proposed means are appropriate for the Finnish conditions, as they can also be used in demanding terrain conditions, in areas without infrastructure and fixed surveillance, and data for the surveillance systems and ESM is transferred successfully also in remote areas and under GPS interference. The ESM represent a completely new technology that is missing from Finland’s means of border surveillance and for which the Border Guard was only recently authorised. The ESM will bring a whole new layer to the situational awareness and risk analysis.</p> <p>The ESM is particularly useful in a situation where Finland is related to instrumentalisation and which is anticipated to continue, if the border crossing points were opened. The ESM does not recognize state borders and thus enables to notice if large groups of people are moving in the vicinity of the border.</p> <p>The new communication and data transfer solutions also provide technology currently missing, enhancing real-time data transfer and ensuring it also in remote areas.</p> <p>UAS surveillance is already in use, but the technology is constantly improving and the UAS fleet needs continuing maintenance and replacement of broken equipment. The proposed activity helps extend the coverage of the UAS surveillance in locations without fixed surveillance and update/upgrade the UAS fleet. The same applies for the operational mobility secured by sufficient number of reliable patrol vehicles.</p>
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<p>i. This need to address these findings is exceptionally being considered in this call, without prejudice to the general approach of the Commission that country should make the implementation of measures to address any identified deficiencies from the Schengen Evaluation or Vulnerability Assessment, especially measures to address serious deficiencies and assessments of non-compliance, a priority for their BMVI programmes. In case your application is justified in the context of Schengen recommendations and/or vulnerability assessments, please also provide additional information explaining why it was not/ would not be possible to address the recommendations concerned using the initial allocation from your BMVI programme in accordance with Article 13 (9) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1148</p> <p>e. other relevant data or information on challenges of a more systemic nature faced at the border sections concerned, including</p>	<p>The proposed means for enhancing the border surveillance capabilities are well in line with the priorities of and respond to the recommendations determined in the latest Schengen evaluation (2023). The main priority is to strengthen the land border surveillance, which requires both sufficient number of trained staff but also introducing new technologies. The need for developing the patrol vehicle fleet is also stated in the Schengen evaluation report (2023).</p> <p>BMVI funding is currently the only source of external funding available for the needs of developing operational mobility and other border surveillance capabilities. However, the initial BMVI funding (excluding Operating Support and Specific Actions) has been already committed to projects and for that reason cannot be used for funding the latest Schengen recommendations.</p>
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<p>where applicable, results of risk analysis f. any other relevant data or information relating to security and/or hybrid threats including those faced at the border sections concerned.</p>	
<p><b>2. Functioning of the proposed surveillance capabilities</b></p> <p>Explain how the proposed surveillance means would operate specifically and how it would improve the situation at the border in concrete terms (e.g., milestones and targets achievements &amp; deadlines, in relation to the expected results)</p>	<p><b>WP1: Building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure</b></p> <p>The FBG gets better and earlier advance information about possible movement (incl. UAS) in the vicinity of the border, which enables a faster reaction to the situation. It is possible to send a patrol or an aircraft or a ship to the area in a timely manner, which can handle the case effectively, and thus border security improves. The FBG is able to operate in an environment where GNSS-interference is constantly present.</p> <p>Since the EMS is a new means the implementation starts with the FBG defining the target state for the ESM capability (incl. CUAS detection features). The implementation starts by making test plans, implementing market research and data acquisition, evaluations of systems and sensors and defining requirements. After that, the activity proceeds to preparing and carrying out procurement processes. The final stage is the introduction of the system and training of personnel to use the new tools. The activity starts at the end of 2024 and is planned to finish by the end of 2028. The FBG will also carry out a market research about GNSS-independent systems and positioning devices and procures the products in question.</p> <p><b>WP2: Data transfer and data transmission solutions for the border infrastructure, enabling and improving situational picture and management of border security</b></p> <p>The Datalink radio system creates a data-secure radio connection for transmitting data between the border surveillance planes, helicopters, off-shore patrol vessels and command centers. The data includes for example video streams and ESM sensor data. The ability enables the use of the information from the surveillance systems in real time. This improves the situational awareness and responsiveness.</p>

The data can be processed securely and cost-effectively with a 'surveillance network' The development of the 'surveillance network' secures the systems from vulnerabilities and other external threats.

Movable Virve 2.0 base stations strengthen the communication connections in areas where the coverage of the radio network is weak. The base station can be moved to spots where most needed.

The actions under WP2 will start in Q1/2025 and are planned to finish by the end of 2026.

### **WP3: Unmanned Aerial Systems**

The UAS are used for patrolling on a daily basis, and they radically extend the area that a patrol can monitor. It is vital, that every operating patrol is equipped with a functional level I1 UAS and at least every Border Guard Station is equipped with functional level I2 UAS.

The UAS have already proven to be crucial for handling the situation of ongoing hybrid operation at the eastern border. The use of UAS has increased radically since the beginning of the hybrid operation, simultaneously increasing the need for adequate funding for procurements.

Situational awareness at the external borders is crucial to preventive measures and operational response. In the most important land border areas the situational picture is formed mainly with fixed and mobile technical monitoring devices. In other areas patrols equipped with UAS and border dogs are the most important resource.

The capability for UAS countermeasures is also to be developed. The UAS are a rapidly developing field of technology and therefore up-to-date CUAS systems improve the FBG's capability to handle different scenarios.

The implementation of WP3 will start in the beginning of 2025 by procuring the new level I2 UAS' which should be in operational use by the end of 2025. Maintaining the achieved level of I1 fleet is carried out by executing the procurements yearly within 2025-2027 since the devices of the existing fleet are on different stages of their lifespan. Procuring new UAS performances and CUAS devices start with market researches in 2025 and the procurements are executed in 2026-2027.

### **Operational mobility (vehicles)**

	<p>There is a total of 53 vehicles in four border guard districts that are not considered reliable to be used in patrolling tasks based on their age or accumulated kilometres.</p> <p>Around 45% of the vehicles waiting to be taken off from patrolling use will be renewed as an additional activity of the proposal. Since the procurements are based on tendered framework agreements, there is a readiness and need to execute the procurements during 2025.</p>
<p><b>3. Complementarity of the project with the BMVI programme and, where relevant, other funding sources (in particular previous specific actions funded under the 2014-2020 ISF – Borders and Visa Policy Instrument)</b></p>	<p>The need to extend and modernise the technical surveillance has been recognised in the national BMVI programme. So far, BMVI funding has not been used for the development of the technical surveillance at the land borders, but the operational mobility at the eastern border has been improved with the BMVI basic allocation and with ISF-B funding.</p> <p>In the programme period 2014-2020 the Finnish Border Guard carried out several ISF-B funded projects which improved the level and coverage of technical surveillance at the eastern land border. ISF funding was also used to procure new kind of technical surveillance capabilities in the form of UAS which could be used in demanding maritime environment ("BEST Surveillance" project funded by ISF-B Union Actions and "Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems for Offshore Patrol Vessels" funded under the national ISF-B programme).</p> <p>Finland has not previously received funding under the specific actions for strengthening the surveillance of the eastern border.</p>
<p><b>4. Coherence of the project with previous and ongoing efforts of the country to reinforce border management capabilities at the external land borders with Russia or Belarus.</b></p>	<p>The Border Guard Act (578/2005) was changed in June 2024 enabling the Finnish Border Guard to execute electronic support measures.</p> <p>The Border Guard has the authority to carry out ESM actions in the vicinity of the national border, in the maritime area, on the sea coast, in the airspace, at a border crossing point and in its immediate vicinity, and in the area under the control of the Border Guard and in its immediate vicinity in order to form a picture of the situation necessary for border control, maintaining border security, enforcing border regulations or protecting the operations of the Border Guard.</p> <p>During the past few years the FBG has started significant and long-term strategic projects aimed at the development of border control.</p> <p>The RAVALU project started in 2020, aiming to renew the technical surveillance systems of land and sea areas. The main goals of the project are the modernization of control systems, introduction of new capabilities and the overall reform of the operational information systems. As a result of the project, the technology used for border</p>

	<p>surveillance will be more cost-effective, reliable and modern, but also the coverage and accuracy of surveillance will improve significantly. Modernized technology is expected to enable not only better monitoring capabilities, but also the ability to react quickly and flexibly to changes of priorities throughout Finland.</p> <p>In 2022, with the onset of the Russia’s brutal aggression towards Ukraine and the rapid change in the Europe’s security environment, the Finnish Government decided to build a fixed border installation at the eastern border. The project is called The Eastern Border Barrier Fence. The fixed border installation of approx. 200 km consists of a fixed border fence, an adjacent operational route, a deforested opening and a technical surveillance system.</p> <p>The project started with a pilot where 3 km of fence was built in South-East Border Guard District, and the finished pilot fence was introduced in October 2023. From there on the project was divided into three phases based on the priority of locations. In the first phase 70 km of fence is built close to border stations which are determined to be the most critical locations. In the second phase 84 km of fence is built on different locations along the eastern border. The third and final phase includes building 44 km of fence close to smaller target areas. At the moment, the actual construction work of the first phase is starting and the rest of the phases will follow. The project is scheduled to be completed in 2026.</p> <p>The FBG is also in the process of replacing two outdated Dornier 228 surveillance aircrafts from 1995 with two new multipurpose aircrafts during 2026-2027. The acquisition of new aircrafts aims at a significant improvement of the operating time and thus, at the coverage of wider areas and stronger long-term operational capacity, more efficient technical sensors, increased transport capacity and the use of the latest technology and more sophisticated technical systems, including real-time, encrypted data transfers.</p> <p>During 2025 and 2026, the FBG will be introducing two new multi-purpose offshore patrol vessels which will be replacing three obsolete offshore patrol vessels. One of the busiest marine areas in the world requires rapid functional capacity and continuous readiness to keep people, property and environment safe and maritime borders secured. The surveillance capabilities of the new vessels have received 23,4 million euros EU funding from Finland’s BMVI programme.</p>
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B) Quality of the proposal	
<b>1. Design, organisation and management of the</b>	The Finnish Border Guard will execute the planning and the overall project implementation, including the supervision and

<p><b>proposal at national and/or transnational level</b></p> <p>Describe the planned implementation methodology, the organisation of work and strategy for project management and monitoring, including the coordination mechanism between project's partners</p>	<p>quality control of all technical activities, and will serve as a focal point of coordination for technical information issues.</p> <p>Technical Division of the Finnish Border Guard HQ will be in charge of the procurement process in close co-operation with Border and Coast Guard Division which has the overall view on operational needs. Finance and Planning Unit of the Finnish Border Guard HQ will support in regards to the financial issues and administrative tasks related to the possible use of external funding.</p> <p>The Finnish Border Guard is an experienced project executor and has settled steering group policies and an internal order in regards to the use of external funding.</p> <p>The beneficiary also needs to report on the progress to the Managing Authority on a regular basis. The Managing Authority monitors that both financial and operational execution are made in the correct way. Communication and visibility will be executed according to the Commission's guidelines. The project will be carefully evaluated based on how it achieved its goals, kept to the schedule and managed the budget.</p>
<p><b>2. Indicative Timetable</b></p> <p>Indicate and justify the duration of the proposal and its activities (to be aligned with the budget form)</p>	<p><b>WP1: Building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure</b>  Q4/2024-Q1/2025 defining the target state, preparing the implementation plan and preparing test plans.  Q2/2025-Q2/2026 system and sensor evaluations and tests.  Q3/2026-Q4/2028 ESM system and sensor procurements, implementation and personnel training.</p> <p><b>WP2: Data transfer and data transmission solutions for the border infrastructure, enabling and improving situational picture and management of border security</b></p> <p>1.1.Network design Q1/2025 – Q4/2025  Building base stations Q4/2025 – Q4/2027  1.2.Testing radios Q1/2025 – Q3/2025  The purchase of radios Q4/2025 – Q3/2026  1.3.Building data processing environment Q1/2025 – Q4/2026  1.4.Completion of development work Q1/2025-Q2/2025  The purchase of base stations Q3/2025-Q2/2026</p> <p><b>WP3: Unmanned Aerial Systems</b></p>

	<p>1.1 Market research and procuring of new UAS performance (i.e. micro-UAS's) Market research continues whole period of 2025-2027 Procuring new UAS performances 2025-2026</p> <p>1.2 Procuring 20-30 level I2 (2-10kg) UAS's Q1-Q2/2025</p> <p>1.3 Maintaining the achieved level of I1 and I2 UAS fleet by implementing procurements of systems and spare parts Annually 2025-2027</p> <p>1.4 Procuring electronic CUAS devices (handheld jammers etc.) Market research Q1-Q2 2025 Procurements Q3/2025-Q2/2026</p> <p><b>Operational mobility (vehicles)</b> Q1/2025: The frames of the patrol vehicles are ordered Q3/2025: The frames of the patrol vehicles are received and delivered to suppliers in charge of equipping the vehicles Q4/2025: Reception of the completed vehicles</p> <p>ATVs and snowmobiles are ordered Q1-Q2/2025. They are basically off the shelf products with reasonable delivery times.</p>
<p><b>3. Information on the budget</b>  (to be aligned with the budget form)</p>	<p><b>Total eligible cost of the proposal (and per country in case of transnational proposal)<sup>3</sup> EUR</b></p> <p><b>Total eligible cost of the proposal EUR: 52.410.901,47</b></p> <p><b>Requested co-financing rate</b></p> <p><b>Requested co-financing rate %: 90</b></p> <p><b>Total EU contribution + 6% Technical Assistance</b></p> <p><b>Total EU contribution EUR : 47.169.811,32</b> <b>6% Technical Assistance EUR : 2.830.188,68</b></p> <p><b>Total amount to be earmarked to the country's programme</b></p> <p><b>Total EUR: 50.000.000,00</b></p> <p><b>Statement from the Managing Authority</b> Declaration indicating that the project proposal, including the information on the budget, has been prepared in accordance with EU and national eligibility rules and can therefore be included into the country's programme. If not yet the case,</p>

<sup>3</sup> Indicate the main activities in the budget form Annex 1

	statement from the Managing Authority that the review process will be done after the selection
	The project proposal, including the information on the budget, has been prepared in accordance with EU and national eligibility rules and can therefore be included into the country's programme.
<p><b>4. Cost-effectiveness of the proposal</b></p> <p>Describe how the proposal was conceived in order to ensure cost-effectiveness</p>	<p>The execution of the ESM has been designed in a way that the projects to be implemented and the capabilities to be procured increase the cost-effectiveness of the FBG in border surveillance. They replace old ineffective solutions or are completely new effective solutions. The lifecycle costs of the procured systems are intended to be economical. These new capabilities will significantly reduce the need for surveillance flights and patrolling which will allow for allocating the human resources more efficiently.</p> <p>The need for a datalink network is based on new performances and does not replace old solutions. The implementation of data transfer has been considered as part of the procurement of the vessels/aircrafts. With the FBG's own datalink network, there is no need to pay separate data transfer fees to commercial operators, which will reduce costs in the long term.</p> <p>The surveillance network will replace the current expensive and fragmented network solution. The surveillance network enables integrating several network environments which reduces duplicate costs. Currently, different systems operate in different network environments and require, for example, the use of different workstations, which is expensive and ineffective.</p> <p>Unmanned Aerial Systems can cover a vast area cost-effectively compared to fixed sensor systems. The Eastern Border Barrier Fence and its surveillance system will cover 200 km of the eastern border, and the most cost-effective way to cover the rest of the border is to purchase mobile surveillance systems, including UASs. The Finnish Border Guard has continuously developed its capability to procure systems in the past years, and it has a good knowledge of the market.</p> <p>Handheld and mobile CUAS-systems (e.g. jammers) are the most cost-effective way to increase the level of UAS countermeasures not only because their price and maintenance</p>

	<p>costs are comparably low, but they are also easy to train and operate.</p> <p>Cost-effectiveness is also ensured through the procurement procedures used. Competitive procurement procedures aim to find the most cost-effective alternatives. The procurements in regards to operational mobility are based on the ongoing framework agreements put out to tender and managed by the central purchasing body for central and local government in Finland (Hansel). A benefit of the framework agreement arrangement is that significant procurement volumes of the public sector lead to more reasonable pricing and beneficial contractual terms. The operations of Hansel are governed by an Act.</p>
<p><b>5. Complementarity of the proposal with the country's programme and other EU funding instruments</b></p> <p>Present how the proposed action builds upon past measures taken on border surveillance in the border sections concerned (including through information on complementarity with past measures funded under the EU budget)</p>	<p>BMVI funding is basically the only funding suitable for the actions presented in this proposal. At the moment, the BMVI funding is fully committed to ongoing projects (excluding Operating Support and Specific Actions).</p> <p>The proposal is well in line with the BMVI programme. Funding has already been used for the improvement of technical surveillance at the sea border, and the FBG has received 23,4 million euros BMVI funding for equipping the new multipurpose OPVs with modern surveillance technology such as radars and thermal cameras. Operational mobility in form of patrol vehicles has also been funded from the BMVI basic allocation, but the funding is not sufficient in relation to the needs. Due to lack of funding, it has not yet been possible to use BMVI funding for the technical surveillance at the eastern border.</p>
<p><b>7. Risk Management</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Potential risks and measures to mitigate them</b></p> <p><b>WP1: Building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Technology develops so quickly that the project cannot keep up with it <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o FBG actively follows the development of the industry and familiarizes itself with the latest solutions with the help of consultants and equipment suppliers</li> <li>o FBG seeks to procure reliable tested and approved technical solutions</li> </ul> </li> <li>- The know-how and resources of the project staff are not enough</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The project management takes care of sufficient resources</li> <li>○ fixed term experts and consultants can be contracted</li> <li>- The desired systems are too expensive <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ FBG prioritizes procurements and implements them in stages as the budget allows</li> </ul> </li> <li>- There is not available system suitable for FBG’s needs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ FBG updates its requirement specification</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>WP2: Data transfer and data transmission solutions for the border infrastructure, enabling and improving situational picture and management of border security</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No national frequency license is granted for the radio system. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The matter is being investigated and already prepared for using alternative technology (for example LEO satellites).</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Radio network cannot be built sufficiently wide with the available funding. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ If necessary, priority areas are created for the network coverage.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Development work of data processing environment is delayed due to national constraints (legislation, partners). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Preliminary investigation of the project is already underway to prevent problems.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Delays in development work of mobile base stations. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Development work is supported by actively participating in testing activities.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>WP3 Unmanned Aerial Systems</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The most significant challenge is succeeding in purchasing cost-effective systems that meet the operational requirements and have an adequate lifespan. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ This can be achieved by refining the requirement specification based on operative experience and market research, and co-operating with other authorities in national and EU-level.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><b>Operational mobility</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The only risk is that the frames of the vehicles might face some delivery issues or delays. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The risk is mitigated by informing the vehicle suppliers in advance of the estimated numbers of the</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
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	<p>vehicles procured, so that they can reserve the production spots at the factory.</p>
	<p><b>Monitoring strategy<sup>4</sup></b></p> <p>Finnish Border Guard has implemented efficient risk management and internal control measures to monitor the risks and mitigation strategies.</p> <p>Regular reports to the MA on progress will be prepared, meetings by project group members or any other mechanisms to keep track of financial and operational steps taken to implement the project in a timely and correct manner will be arranged. In addition to reports, the MA monitors the projects by participating in the meetings of the project steering groups, to which the beneficiary is obliged to invite the MA.</p>
<p><b>8. Compliance with the EU acquis</b></p> <p>Explain how this proposal would be covered by the rules applicable to the country's programme that ensure actions are in compliance with the EU acquis including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and, where applicable international obligations of the Union and the country arising from international obligations from the international instruments to which they are part</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Articles 4 and 13(1) ISF</li> <li>• Articles 3, 5, 6 and 16(1) AMIF</li> <li>• Articles 3, 4 and 13(1) BMVI</li> <li>• Article 9 CPR</li> </ul>	<p>The activities planned in this project are designed and will be implemented in full compliance with the Schengen Borders Code.</p> <p>All activities of the Finland's program consider the horizontal principles according to Article 9 of the General Regulation on Funds (CPR). The program and implemented actions are based on common European values and respect for the rule of law, equality, equality and fundamental and human rights. The gender perspective and the realization of children's rights are also integrated into the supported activities and are promoted in all phases. EU data protection rules are followed in all activities of the program. Reducing the carbon footprint is considered in all operations and performance development.</p> <p>The means of transport deployed as additional activities will be compliant with Frontex standards, where they exist.</p>

<sup>4</sup> For instance, regular reports to the MA on progress; meetings by project group members or any other mechanisms to keep track of financial and operational steps taken to implement the project in a timely and correct manner

<p>Where appropriate, confirm that any equipment, means of transport or infrastructure deployed as additional activities will be compliant with Frontex standards, where they exist</p>	
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<p style="text-align: center;"><b>C) Impact of the proposal</b></p>	
<p><b>1. Overall impact on national capabilities</b></p> <p>Demonstrate the added value of the proposed new surveillance capabilities as part of the integrated border management by the country concerned (national capability plan etc). This could relate to interoperability and integration with other systems and tools in place</p> <p>Where appropriate, explain how the proposed new means of surveillance would contribute to an increase in recording detected movements, which would in turn improve the quality of the</p>	<p>The core of the proposal is the improvement of the intelligence capabilities and the situational awareness which bring necessary information to be used for the risk analysis. Risk analysis forms the basis for the allocation of resources including mobile patrols.</p> <p>The proposed new surveillance capabilities will improve the intelligence at both land and sea borders by detecting movements and giving an early warning about possible illegal border crossers. The activities will increase the situational awareness at Finland's eastern border and feed into the National Situational Picture and eventually the European Situational Picture.</p> <p>Illegal border crossings can be prevented efficiently.</p>

<p>National Situational Picture and the European Situational Picture</p>	
<p><b>2. Expected impact on the EU external border</b></p> <p>Describe the concrete benefits and quantified results of the proposal on the integrated border management of the EU.</p>	<p>Sudden changes at the Finland’s eastern border may have significant impact on other EU member states as well. Therefore, enhancing the surveillance capabilities of Finland improves the Union’s preparedness for and prevention of hybrid and other threats. The positive effects of this proposal can be seen as an improved coverage and effectiveness of technical surveillance which helps all the national officials in charge of border management but the improved situational awareness also benefits EU as a whole.</p> <p>The benefits of the ESM capability are difficult to reach with any other means. It is challenging to estimate the exact coverage or quantified results at this stage, but it is obvious, that the ESM will significantly reduce the need for surveillance flights and patrolling, which will allow for allocating the resources more efficiently.</p> <p>Datalink radio system will provide a significant improvement in aircrafts’/vessels’ data transfer rates, which is essential for the use of modern sensors. Movable base stations will complement the gaps in the coverage of the radio network used by patrols which ensures transferring data in challenging terrains. The development of the data processing environment will improve the cost-effectiveness of information systems in the long term. With the help of reliable data transmission, it is possible to create an up-to-date situational picture, which contributes to the European situational picture and enables resources to be allocated where they are most needed.</p> <p>The coverage of mobile technical border surveillance will increase substantially. The target number of level I2 UAS’s to be purchased is 20-30 and the whole maintained fleet consists of almost 200 UAS’s. The coverage of fixed technical surveillance of the Finnish-Russian land border is now approx. 15% of the border length, and the level of mobile surveillance in the remaining 85% of the land border will be substantially increased. UAS countermeasures capabilities will also be increased.</p> <p>The range of the UAS is undeniably supreme compared to fixed surveillance or patrolling by border guards. The use of patrols can be targeted better using the information provided by the UAS.</p> <p>24 vehicles, 18 ATVs and 34 snowmobiles to be used in Lapland, North Karelia, Kainuu and Southeast Finland border guard districts will be purchased. A total of 53 vehicles are not considered reliable</p>

	<p>for patrolling at the moment and they are waiting for replacement. About 45% of the vehicles waiting to be taken off from patrolling use will be renewed.</p> <p>The procured vehicles will be registered in the Frontex Technical Equipment Pool based on the Annual Bilateral Negotiations with Agency which will strengthen the disposable equipment of the standing corps.</p>
<p><b>3. Additional activities</b></p> <p>Where appropriate, provide justifications in the case of a need for highly specialised equipment or means of transport (deployed as additional activities), as well - in case of additional staff needs for operating the additional equipment - that the required trainings and skills will be put in place</p>	<p>The mobility of the patrols is essential for carrying out the activities. The level of patrol vehicles is not at a sufficient level, which was noticed also in the Schengen evaluation (2023). Despite technical surveillance, patrolling is needed, and different technical means and patrols complement each other as part of the border control. The proposal focuses on surveillance technology, incl. movable equipment, and humans are also needed in the right places to use the equipment.</p>
<p><b>4. Link with the indicators of the country's programme (Annex VIII to the Fund/Instrument-specific Regulations)</b></p> <p>Indicate the changes to the programme's output and results indicators</p>	<p>Output indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>O.1.5 Number of aerial vehicles purchased (20-30)</li> <li>O.1.5.1 of which Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) (20-30)</li> <li>O.1.7 Number of land transport means purchased (24)</li> <li>O.1.10 Number of IT functionalities developed/ maintained /upgraded (4)</li> </ul> <p>Result indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>R.1.14 The number of items of equipment registered in the technical equipment pool of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency</li> <li>R.1.15 The number of items of equipment put at the disposal of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency</li> <li>R.1.18 The number of addressed recommendations from Schengen evaluations and from vulnerability assessments in the area of border management</li> </ul>

<b>Date</b>	<b>Signature</b>
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*Legal Notice: In case the proposal is successful, the EU contribution for the project under the specific action will be included in the country's BMVI programme by means of a programme amendment approved by the Commission and implemented in accordance with the provisions of the BMVI Regulation (EU) BMVI: 2021/1148 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (Common Provisions Regulation). The financial and reporting obligations for any beneficiary of the specific action are the same as those that apply to the country's programmes.*

As Managing Authority, I agree to include the successful project in the programme and ensure that the project will be implemented in accordance with the provisions of the BMVI Regulation (EU) BMVI: 2021/1148 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (Common Provisions Regulation).

Signature & Date	<u>Legal representative of the Managing Authority:</u>  Laura Yli-Vakkuri, Director General
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## **Annex 1**

### **Relevant initiatives and projects aimed at enhancing the border capabilities**

The Finnish Border Guard has implemented several projects aiming to enhance border capabilities with governmental funding but also external funding from ISF (2014-2020) and BMVI (2021-2027).

The most relevant projects in regards to the actions included in the proposal are listed in the table below:

<b>Project</b>	<b>Funding</b>
BEST Surveillance, ISFB-2017-AG-ESUR	ISF 2014-2020 Union actions
Renewing patrol vehicles, II & III	ISF 2014-2020
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems for Offshore Patrol Vessels	ISF 2014-2020
Renewing patrol vehicles	BMVI 2021-2027
RAVALU	Governmental funding

Building an Electronic Support Measures (WP1) infrastructure is a totally new capability and it does not build upon any previous or existing project. However, there is a link to the ongoing RAVALU project which started in 2020. The aim of the RAVALU project is to renew the technical surveillance systems of land and sea areas by modernizing control systems, introducing new capabilities and reforming operational information systems as a whole. As a result of the project, the technology used for border surveillance will be more cost-effective, reliable and modern, but also the coverage and accuracy of surveillance will improve significantly. Modernized technology is expected to enable not only better monitoring capabilities, but also ability to react quickly and flexibly to changes of priorities throughout Finland.

During the programme period 2014-2020 the Finnish Border Guard carried out two EU-funded projects where UAS' were procured. Since the solutions in this field of technology develop at a fast pace it cannot be stated that the current proposal of procuring UAS' (WP3) builds directly upon these two projects but they did provide the FBG with valuable information on the capabilities of UAS' in operational use. The first project was ISF Union Actions funded project Baltic External borders Surveillance Technology Performance Enhancement project to strengthen the European Border Surveillance System (BEST Surveillance, ISFB-2017-AG-ESUR). This project consisted of several work packages and one of them included procuring two UAS' suitable for maritime environment in particular. Later, a third UAS' was procured with the help of nationally administrated ISF funding under project "Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems for Offshore Patrol Vessels".

The FBG develops operational mobility on a regular basis and has executed several projects where patrol cars, all-terrain vehicles (ATV) and snowmobiles have been renewed with the assistance of EU funding. In the programme period of 2014-2020 there were three different projects (Renewing patrol vehicles, II & III) where a total of 158 patrol cars, ATVs and

snowmobiles were procured. During the ongoing BMVI programme period 2021-2027 one project “Renewing patrol vehicles” was carried out and as a result the FBG received 212 new patrol vehicles, ATVs and snowmobiles.

<b>ANNEX 2 - BUDGET FORM</b>		
	<i>Member State may provide an additional budget form to complement their application</i>	
<b>Information about the project proposal for the Specific Action</b>		
<b>Fund/Instrument</b>	BMVI	
<b>Specific Objective</b>	SO1	
<b>Specific Action</b>	Enhancing border surveillance capabilities for countries at the borders with Russia and Belarus	
<b>Reference number of the call</b>	BMVI/2024/SA/1.4.2	
<b>Title of the project proposal</b>	<b>Enhancing border surveillance capabilities at Finland's eastern border</b>	
	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Total eligible cost of the project proposal [incl./excl. VAT, based on CPR rules Art. 64(1)(c); see also section 2 of the call for expression of interest]</b>
	VAT included	
	<b>Work Package 1: Building an Electronic Support Measures (ESM) infrastructure</b>	<b>28 865 901,47</b>
	Activity 1.1 Consulting for defining the target state, preparing the implementation plans and test plans.	627 500,00
	Activity 1.2 Market research, system and sensor evaluations and tests in the project	1 255 000,00
	Activity 1.3 ESM system and sensor procurements including implementation and training of the end-users	25 100 901,47

	Activity 1.4 GNSS-independent systems and positioning devices	1 882 500,00
	<b>Work Package 2: Data transfer and data transmission solutions for the border infrastructure, enabling and improving situational picture and management of border security</b>	<b>12 550 000,00</b>
	Activity 1.1 Approx. 24 base stations of the radio network	8 400 000,00
	Activity 1.2 Radio and antenna purchase to OPV's and helicopters	840 000,00
	Activity 1.3 Data processing environment for FBG's surveillance data including expert work and procurement of servers, switches, encryption devices and workstations.	2 260 000,00
	Activity 1.4 Approx. 12 movable base stations for the public safety network Virve 2.0	1 050 000,00
	<b>Work Package 3: Border surveillance systems</b>	<b>6 275 000,00</b>
	Activity 1.1 Market research and procuring of new UAS performances	627 500,00
	Activity 1.2 Procuring 20-30 level I2 (2-10kg) UAS's	2 510 000,00
	Activity 1.3 Maintaining the achieved level of I1 and I2 UAS fleet	2 510 000,00
	Activity 1.4 Procuring electronic CUAS devices	627 500,00
	<b>Work Package 4: Operational mobility</b>	<b>4 720 000,00</b>
	Activity 1.1 Patrol vehicles	3 575 495,00
	Activity 1.2 All-terrain vehicles (ATVs)	404 055,00
	Activity 1.3 Snowmobiles	740 450,00
	<b>Total eligible cost of the project proposal (a)</b>	<b>52 410 901,47</b>
	<b>Total EU contribution to the project proposal (b)</b> (b = max. 90% of a)	47 169 811,32

	<b>Technical assistance (c)</b> (c = 6% of b)	2 830 188,68
	<b>Total EU Contribution to be earmarked to the MS programme (b+c)</b>	50 000 000,00