Prime Minister Vanhanen at the Centre Party Foreign and Security Policy Seminar

Government Communications Department
Publication date 2.4.2008 9.56
Type:Speech -

Old and new security factors

The year 2008 will be a significant one in terms of Finland’s security and defence policies. The Government will submit its new Finnish Security and Defence Policy Report. Finland holds the position of Chairmanship to the OSCE and has decided to participate in the NATO Response Force (NRF), and furthermore, co-operation between the Nordic countries is clearly strengthening.

In my address, I will highlight various security challenges from a broad security perspective, by discussing the capabilities of the European Union to respond to these challenges and why it is especially important to establish a strong and unified European Union in order to do so. Finally, I will present traditional security themes, such as regional stability, the credibility of our defence capabilities and the possible impacts of membership in NATO.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This seminar is being held for the purpose of preparing for next summer’s Centre Party Congress. In 2006, the Party Congress approved the position that the European Union would assume a greater role in the country’s foreign and security policies. Today, this remains the correct approach to take. Finland must endeavour to strengthen the European Union, which connects all Europeans while ensuring peace, democracy and stable economic development for our continent. The Party Congress also stated its support for Finland’s commitment to the building of a strong, renewable European Union. This has been the guideline for our activities since. In June, we will gather for the next Party Congress in order to outline the future, which will hold great significance for the drafting of the Government’s new Security and Defence Policy Report.

As regards the said position, I believe that the Party Congress hit the nail right on the head. It has become evident that the concrete security risks and dangers which most concern our citizens involve, almost without exception, something other than the military. They represent issues for which the best results can be reached through co-operation with our European partners.

The umbrella term for our current security policy is one that has become very familiar to us all: broad security.

The problems within the concept of broad security are numerous and even more timely today. These problems share the characteristic that they extend beyond national borders.

The tsunami, avian flu and appalling terrorist acts are new additions to our security landscape. The spread of weapons of mass destruction in connection with terrorism poses an unparalleled threat.

Today, when the world is even more interconnected and Finns are travelling more, even the most distant tragedies affect us deeply. For Finland, natural disasters generally pose a minimal threat, but we face a greater threat from different environmental catastrophes. This leads me to mention, in particular, the Baltic Sea, which, in actuality, is already in a state of environmental distress, but one can only imagine what the situation would be as a result of, for example, a devastating oil spill or nuclear power accident within our immediate surroundings.

A similar type, but even more serious threat, is the threat of a possible epidemic, such as the avian flu, which we have managed to avoid to date, but which many experts and researchers feel is simply biding its time. We have prepared ourselves for the possible pandemic that the avian flu may impose and we have allocated a considerable amount of financial resources for this purpose. This serves as proof of the reality of this threat.

In time, climate change will also have an indirect effect on the safety of Finland and its citizens. Climate change can weaken already weakened societies to the brink of crisis, resulting in mass migratory movements and widespread disputes over dwindling natural resources. This topic was also discussed in the Solana report, which was presented to the European Council in March.

There are, however, other issues within the concept of broad security. The same factors which affect our lives in a positive way, such as global networking and mutual co-operation, and a strengthening sense of solidarity and dependence, may also have negative impacts. This is certainly the case, for example, in terms of the spread of narcotics, human trafficking, and international organised crime in general, not to mention terrorism. As our dependence on communications networks and systems increases, so does our vulnerability, through both unintentional and wilful disturbances and interferences.

There is no way for us to eliminate these types of threats and risks, once they are in effect. On the other hand, we must prepare for them and, in most cases, do so through joint efforts with our partners. One example of such an endeavour concerns our efforts to deal with climate change. Within the European Union, we are responding to climate change by several means, and are jointly striving to create a global understanding with regard to ways in which to slow the process of climate change. Security policies are not only constructed for the purpose of warding off threats, but should also comprise methods aimed at their prevention. It is understood that many threats are generated by human distress and need – poverty, unemployment, despair – which, in turn, breed radicalization and ethnic conflicts. It is crucial to remember that development co-operation is also a part of the concept of broad security. There will be no true security without worldwide development. This matter was also discussed in the Special Session of the UN, which began yesterday.

New threats are best countered through co-operation with others and preparation. In order to achieve broad security, we must be ready to assume a role in crisis management and we must have seamless co-operation between various authorities. Within this new concept of broad security, the military takes a back seat.

We can quite proudly state – and I sincerely hope that, in this case, pride does not go before the fall – that, in Finland, we have a carefully planned and implemented crisis management system, which is based on legislation and the co-operation of competent authorities. If necessary – if a crisis should reach national proportions – the Prime Minister can make the decision to take over the general command of the crisis management within the mandate of the Government. For the purpose of implementing crisis management, we have also invested in the development of an operational command centre and situation awareness activities. These models have evolved over the last five years. It is quite telling that when I entered the office of Prime Minister, the State administration did not have, for example, a common security situation picture. The new Government programme, therefore, set out to emphasise crisis management competence on both the regional and local level.

This brings us back to where I began. European Union membership means that our efforts to prepare ourselves against new threats are evermore international. And this is precisely the most compelling reason for us to participate in efforts to build an even stronger Union.

Now, with the years of work involved in the preparation of the Lisbon Treaty behind us, we are able to focus on its implementation and the opportunities it offers to have influence on the global level. The EU has at its disposal a diverse range of methods geared toward international diplomacy. Finland also has many different levels on which to implement international co-operation. During our chairmanship of the Nordic Council, we focused on globalisation and what the Nordic Countries could offer to the rest of the world. There are also many co-operative projects related to the Baltic Sea region in which we actively contribute. Additionally, we are able to contribute through the work of the OSCE, the European Council and the UN. The role of the UN should never be forgotten or underestimated in terms of its efforts to prevent worldwide problems.

Dear friends,

With this in mind, it is appropriate to turn our attention to the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty is anticipated to enter into force at the start of next year, once it has been ratified by all of the member states of the Union.

There seems to be an overwhelming vagueness about what the Lisbon Treaty involves, or more to the point, to what we are also in this process committing ourselves to. I believe that the Lisbon Treaty considerably reinforces the Union’s ability to act even more efficiently on the global level, and also to provide solutions to our security challenges.

The Lisbon Treaty contains a fundamental commitment to provide assistance to other member states, as a so-called solidarity clause. This assistance concerns terrorist attacks, civilian accidents and natural disasters, and, specifically, any issues that fall within the scope of broad security. All members of the Union must be prepared to help one another.

Another concern is the so-called security guarantees. The Treaty states that if a member state should become the target of an armed attack, the other member states are obligated to provide assistance to the degree stipulated in the UN Charter. On the other hand, the text also states, as is known, that this shall not affect the special nature of the security and defence policies of certain member states. It also emphasises that NATO serves as a joint defence foundation for its member states.

Our national discourse seems a bit fixated on precisely this security guarantee issue. Our other partners have not made this guarantee issue into a problem.

Above all, the security guarantee article reinforces the mutual solidarity between the European Union member states. We have the right to expect the support of the other member states, if we should need it, and we also hold the explicit obligation to help another member state that requires and requests our assistance. Finland has made this commitment.

It is obvious that mere membership in the European Union is a factor that fundamentally consolidates our security; this being one of the most compelling arguments already then when we decided to join the Union. We represent one member of a powerful alliance, the European Union, and we are highly committed to the Union. We have clearly chosen our path. The Union, to which we have acceded, may also elect to make a shift, in accordance with the valid Charter article, to a common defence by a single decision of the European Council. In other words, this possibility exists, but this has not been an active matter for discussion, since the challenges facing Europe are currently other than the threat of conventional war.

These threats are also expressed in the European Union’s security strategy from 2003, which is currently under reform. This strategy listed terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and international organised crime as the greatest threats to Europe.

It is worthy to note that the EU is developing at a very rapid rate in the area of security policy. There is a distinct need for this development as well, since, in its capacity as a multidisciplinary actor, the EU is capable of responding to the multidisciplinary threats of the future. The EU’s fortitude lies in its comprehensiveness and broad range of available methods. This is precisely the areas which the member states wish to better utilise. It is clear that co-operation in security and defence policies will deepen within the EU. A strong EU is also an advantage for Finland.

Dear friends,

This brings me to the other facet of security, which we might call, say, traditional security; in other words, the defence and military aspects of security.

What did the Party Congress say about this in 2006? It stated: "For the purposes of defending Finland, the essential factors include obligatory military service, responsibility for defending our territory and the defence system supporting it, as well as maintenance of the strong will of our citizens to defend our country.” We would be hard pressed to say that any other way even today.

Let’s examine the circumstances upon which the Party Congress made that statement.

Although the world around us has changed a great deal over recent decades, Finland’s geopolitical stance has not changed in any significant way. We remain Russia’s neighbouring country, sharing an extensive border. Above all, Russia signifies for us a neighbour, a neighbour, and a neighbour. But Russia has changed fundamentally in terms of its societal systems since the Cold War era. Finland has a great interest in Russia remaining stable and co-operative. We want Russia to share our common European values. And to this end, we must be patient.

Our immediate surroundings have also otherwise become more stable. The Baltic countries, no longer under the power of the former Soviet Union, are now members of both the EU and NATO. The European Union, which was intended at its beginnings and still today must be viewed as a peace project, has spread further to the East, breeding stability in its path. With time, this will also be the case in Southeast Europe. The United States’ commitment to Europe remains an essential element for the stability of Europe.

From Finland’s perspective, certain conclusions can be made. Russia does not pose a military threat to Finland. There is no imminent military threat from any other direction either. There is no foreseeable major war or danger of a large-scale crisis in this region. It is even harder to imagine a conflict or attack, which would be directed only at Finland.

It is necessary, however, for a sovereign country to prepare to defend itself, if, for a reason that is presently unknown, we find ourselves in a situation that requires defence. The credibility of defence is, in practice, a central part of creating stability for our own environment. We must take fire insurance, even though there is only a remote danger of a fire.

The defence forces are the most successful at implementing their duties if they are never actually required. A good defensive faculty creates a deterrent, a threshold which no one undertakes to try to cross. One should remember that the objectives of war are always political. We must use our own abilities to express that political agendas need not be pursued by military means.

This is also the reason why the Party Congress for that year ended with the aforementioned statement. We must be able to defend our own country. No one else will do it for us, not even if we decide to join a military alliance. The defence of our own country will always be our responsibility. We do not have the option to simply act as a free rider.

Logical thinking dictates that if there exists military potential in our region, we should have access to it, even though we do not view it as likely that we will need it. Should the defence competence be dissolved, it would easily signify, depending on the military branch in question, a 10-20 year undertaking to restore it by acquiring the same equipment and training the sufficient reserve forces. Not to mention the fact that it would likely be difficult to build up a unified will for national defence, once a system based on obligatory military service had already been dissolved.

Therefore, we need to maintain the credibility of our defence. For us, this means maintaining obligatory military service. It is also signifies the need for a defence system that covers the entire country. The will of the people in terms of defending our country is also one necessary factor, and our tradition of obligatory military service has a positive effect thereon.

In this context, I would also like to point out that our competence to defend our own country is being further fostered through international co-operation and, in particular, through crisis management. In addition to proving our solidarity by participating in operations led by the EU or NATO or our contributions to the EU battle groups and, in the future, in NATO’s NRF troops, our own defence forces gain the possibility to improve their own functionality.

Of our defence resources, altogether 98 % is allocated for use in our own country and 2 % for international co-operation, which, in turn, helps in developing our defence forces and their ability to work co-operatively with others. There is no justification for setting these against one another. International co-operation does not dig into our national defence, but rather serves to strengthen it.

I do not wish to further speculate about the Security and Defence Policy Report, which will be presented to Parliament during this year. It is clear, however, that one of the biggest challenges for the report, perhaps the greatest challenge, is to figure out how we will be able to continue to guarantee the credibility of our defence forces. This credibility is not gained through figures, but rather through competence, expertise and adequate material.

The modernization of the defence forces is one absolute prerequisite. This signifies considerably expensive technology both in terms of weaponry and, in particular, management systems. The situation can be, to a certain extent, facilitated by co-operation, particularly in terms of defence material, within the framework of the Nordic countries and the European Union, but the problem, and here I refer to a financial problem, is still facing us.

The leadership of the defence forces have, on several occasions, communicated that a sufficient training and equipping of the reserve forces, to their currently planned extent, cannot be accomplished within the constraints of the calculated economic resources. It may also be true that diminishing age groups in the future will no longer have sufficient numbers of men and women to supply reserve forces of the same size as today. Our current reserve forces are large in relation to our surrounding regions, but on a logical scale with respect for our doctrine, at approximately 250,000 – 350,000 strong.

Finally, a few words about our possible NATO membership; this is evidently the issue for which we anticipate most clarification from the report, even though there will not be any surprises. The commission for the report specifically mentions that the impacts of entering into an alliance or remaining outside of that alliance must be clarified, and for this purpose, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has already made a survey to be included in the report as applicable. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs has also investigated this matter.

In time, I, at least, have begun to feel that this question has lost a considerable amount of its political weight. Why is this the case?

First of all, as I have already stated, we do not face any military threat, which would require a military alliance as such. Secondly, the NATO which seems to loom in the minds of many, that is, a Cold War actor and guarantor of the Western world, no longer exists.

The NATO of today is primarily a crisis management and political co-operation organisation, the efforts of which Finland has, in many ways, contributed to. Over recent years, the majority of Finland’s crisis management contribution has occurred within NATO-led operations, and one NATO operation has been led by a Finnish soldier.

One might say that, nowadays, Finland can participate in any and all NATO operations which we feel require our participation.

In that way, NATO membership is actually now more a practical matter than anything else. Even though NATO’s charter contains the renowned Article 5, i.e. the obligation for collective defence, which, if the international situation should find itself heading in an unfavourable direction, could rise once again to the surface to adopt a very crucial position, and although we must consider that NATO membership would be advantageous for Finland in terms of planning our own defence, the future of NATO, as well as Finland’s possible membership, will need to be examined with particular regard to crisis management and the related needs and decision-making processes.

I have already repeatedly stated that the report that is currently being drawn up is not for the purposes of seeking NATO membership. I also made this point clear as the Party’s position prior to the Parliamentary elections, and the election results were based, in part, on the public’s hearing this message. The possibility of membership will, however, require us to re-examine it with an open mind in the future as well. We are not closing any doors.

In reading the NATO report drawn up by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which I mentioned earlier, one cannot help but get the impression that membership would have a two-way impact. The positive factors relate to the participation in decision-making and the security guarantee. Membership would also serve to strengthen the relationship between Finland and the United States. On the other hand, membership might also place solidarity pressure on Finland to participate in such operations, which we do not necessarily agree with.

Alongside those positive arguments for membership, my thinking is also influenced by two perspectives that are worth mentioning. The citizens of NATO member states should actively support their country’s membership and the related obligations to participate in joint operations. No one enters a club with the refusal to act, but rather one commits to participating in the work of the organisation. We see a good example of this now in Afghanistan; those peace partners, who have offered their troops to the North, earn higher esteem for the alliance, while those member states which are avoiding their battle duties in Southern Afghanistan have earned disrespect within the alliance. Secondly, I wonder how possible membership might impact on our political latitude and on our abilities to define our political stands on our own terms, or would we be, in redeeming solidarity from others, dependent on the political views of those countries, whose help we may need in a possible moment of crisis.

I feel that we are in no hurry with regard to this matter. Our co-operation with NATO is developing well, in any case. Our situation and surroundings are stable.

We need to remain vigilant in following the development of NATO and assessing the advantages and disadvantages of membership, in a matter-of-fact manner, objectively and from a factual standpoint. NATO is not an emotional issue. The matter is not simply black and white.

The report being prepared needs to keep the possibility of NATO membership alive. In my thinking, Finland’s long-standing policy in the years following the war has been to strengthen our national latitude and the freedom of choice. We should not use negative decisions to spontaneously close doors ahead of us and limit our latitude politically. We have traversed the Cold War to reach our currently positive situation, and the decisions are unambiguously in our own hands. This is what every sovereign nation has always sought.

Matti Vanhanen