Overview of information influence activities
Information influence activities are goal-oriented and systematic acts aimed at influencing public opinion, perceptions and behaviour and undermining the ability of society to function. Methods include disseminating false or misleading information, exerting pressure and using true information in a manipulative way.
The goal of information influence activities is to weaken decision-making capacity, social cohesion and resilience. Selective or false information can be used to incite or exacerbate fears, uncertainties and conflicts in society. Targets can be swayed to make decisions that are harmful to them or to act against their own interests. Targets can counter the effects of this hostile behaviour by protecting their own functional capacity.
The Prime Minister’s Office produces an overview of information influence activities targeting Finland based on public sources at least once a year. The overview focuses on state influence activities targeted at Finland from outside its borders. Its purpose is to improve situational awareness regarding information influence activities.
Review 2025
15 January 2025
The main perpetrator of information influence activities targeting Finland is Russia. Russia’s information influence activities are not exceptional, nor is Finland Russia’s primary target. Russia uses the same forms of information influence regardless of the target country.
Russia’s information influence activities directed at the West often feature threatening rhetoric intended to incite fear:
- Russia spreads false claims and information stating that support for Ukraine leads to financial difficulties and poses security risks.
- Russia presents NATO as a threatening and aggressive alliance and disseminates disinformation about its activities.
- According to Russia, Western sanctions and decision-making are rooted in anti-Russia sentiment and are not the result of Russia’s illegal war of aggression in Ukraine.
Number and nature of information influence activities
Information influence activities directed at Finland are not significant in terms of the number of incidents, and their content is typical of that used by Russia in its information influence activities targeting the West. Prior to Finland’s NATO membership, Russia’s information influence activities were largely persuasive in nature, emphasising the importance of neighbourly relations and trade between Finland and Russia. After Finland joined NATO, Russia began to treat Finland in the same aggressive way it treats other NATO countries.
The role of state media
Russian state media is a key channel for Russia’s influence activities. Russia does not have direct access to the Finnish information environment, so its influence activities often involve disseminating content to the general public in Finland through social and traditional media. Against this background, experts play an especially important role in providing context for this media content and combating its harmful effects.
Key themes
Russia’s rhetoric and information influence activities related to Finland focus especially on Finland’s NATO membership and relations between Finland and Russia. Themes include the increasingly tense security environment in the Baltic Sea region, and disinformation and speculation on the activities of the United States and other NATO countries in Finland. For example, Russia falsely claims that exercises conducted by Finland other NATO members and efforts to protect critical infrastructure pose a security threat.
Support for Ukraine
Russia’s primary objective has been to weaken the West’s support for Ukraine. The main targets of influence activities are the United States and other countries that supply greater quantities of defence materiel to Ukraine than Finland does. Finland’s defence materiel support to Ukraine and its negative economic and security impacts on Finland have only been mentioned occasionally.
Sanctions policy
Russia’s information influence activities present Western sanctions and political decisions as anti-Russia policies and not as a response to Russia’s illegal war of aggression. Russia accuses the West of being unwilling to support peace in Ukraine at the same time as Russia attacks civilian targets in Ukraine.
Propaganda about great power politics
Russia frames NATO as part of the United States’ great power politics. Finland’s accession to NATO is a failure with respect to Russia’s aspirations to be a great power. With this in mind, Russia has ramped up its narrative that NATO membership represents a loss of independence for Finland and other small states. The aim of these claims is to undermine the trust of Europeans and Finns in NATO.
Downplaying Ukraine’s successes
Because of its unwillingness to recognise Ukraine’s military successes, Russia considers it important to blame the West for getting involved in the war. Partly for this reason, disinformation has been disseminated on social media and digital platforms claiming that Western countries have been secretly participating in Ukrainian land operations and drone attacks on Russia. Disinformation about drone attacks launched from Finnish soil has been disseminated for more than a year.
Shaping the information environment
Russia’s threatening and aggressive rhetoric and information influence activities will continue, as they are key tools of state power for Russia. Through its information influence activities, Russia aims to shape attitudes and expectations in a way it considers favourable. Russia’s own population is often the target of these activities, but content has also been disseminated effectively in the Finnish information environment.
Trust and unity
A key strategic goal of Russia’s information influence activities is to weaken alliances and communities. Russia is attempting to undermine trust in NATO and the United States in particular. Highlighting political conflicts and spreading disinformation in order to sow discord are traditional means used by perpetrators of information influence activities.
Disinformation about NATO presence
In the future, disinformation or misleading claims may be spread about Finland’s NATO policy or about NATO forces or structures in Finland. This has previously happened in the Baltic States, for example.
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