Overview of information influence activities

Information influence activities are goal-oriented and systematic acts aimed at influencing public opinion, perceptions and behaviour and undermining the ability of society to function. Methods include disseminating false or misleading information, exerting pressure and using true information in a manipulative way.  

The goal of information influence activities is to weaken decision-making capacity, social cohesion and resilience. Selective or false information can be used to incite or exacerbate fears, uncertainties and conflicts in society. Targets can be swayed to make decisions that are harmful to them or to act against their own interests. Targets can counter the effects of this hostile behaviour by protecting their own functional capacity.  

The Prime Minister’s Office produces an overview of information influence activities targeting Finland based on public sources at least once a year. The overview focuses on state influence activities targeted at Finland from outside its borders. Its purpose is to improve situational awareness regarding information influence activities.

This overview focuses on sources representing the Russian state and on state media, which is a key channel for Russia’s influence activities. As Russia’s ability to operate in the Finnish information environment is limited, its influence activities often involve disseminating content to the general public in Finland through social and traditional media. The overview sheds light on Russia’s objectives and the messages it uses to achieve them.

Review 2026

12 March 2026 

In 2025, Russia’s discourse about Finland was more derisive and hostile than in 2024. This was mainly due to Finland’s actions as part of the NATO Alliance, such as building up capabilities and hosting them in Finland. 

Russia has also been irritated by the prominent role of President Alexander Stubb in the foreign and security policy debate, which has emphasised the sovereignty of Ukraine and Russia’s responsibility for the illegal military action there. Russia has reacted to this with mockery and aggression in an attempt to downplay President Stubb’s position.

Russia's hardened rhetoric shows its own situation has worsened

Russia tends to harden its rhetoric towards its opponents as its own situation becomes more difficult. Moreover, Russia’s ability to persuade Europe is very limited at the moment, leaving it little alternative to threats and attempts to exert pressure. 

The bleak outlook for the Russian economy, the effects of the illegal war of aggression on society and Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil infrastructure are making Russia’s situation even more difficult, and its military actions in Ukraine are not proceeding as Russia would like. Russia’s aggressive rhetoric, accusations and demands reflect this situation, which can also be seen in Russia’s attitude towards Finland.

Russia has reacted especially strongly when Finland has highlighted historical facts. Russia has created its own selective historical narrative, which it seeks to defend. This narrative is of utmost importance to Russia in communicating to its citizens and maintaining national unity. The fact that Finland dares to challenge this narrative is seen in Russia as aggression towards it.

NATO and military actions

Russia describes NATO as a threat to its security. Efforts to strengthen NATO’s defence are presented in Russia as aggression towards the country. For example, Russia emphasises the fact that NATO conducts exercises ‘close to the Russian border’, even though in reality, exercises have been carried out in the same areas for a long time.

Preparedness and civil defence activities in Finland and other European countries are also used as evidence of the military threat posed by the West, even in the case of normal preparedness measures that have nothing to do with military exercises.

Economic sanctions and the economy

Over the past year, there has been a particular increase in claims and news coverage by Russia stating that sanctions against Russia are detrimental to Finland. Russian media focuses on the economies and problems of countries it considers hostile, which directs attention away from Russia’s deteriorating economy and the effects of the war on society. 

At the moment, it is very important for Russia to be able to normalise its trade relations as soon as possible. A key objective of Russia’s information influence activities is thus to convince others that sanctions against Russia are more detrimental than beneficial. However, Finland is not a major target for these influence efforts on the whole.

Economic stability and livelihoods are very important themes for the Russian population. The discrepancy between the expectations of the population and the state’s economic challenges is expected to grow. This creates a significant vulnerability for Russia.

Power politics and sphere-of-interest thinking

Russia stepped up its power politics rhetoric towards Finland in 2025. In justifying its wars and war crimes, Russia employs rhetoric about the feasibility and legitimacy of land transfers in the resolution of wars and conflicts. For example, the fact that Finland ceded territory to the Soviet Union has been used by the Russian media over the past year as an example of how ceding Ukrainian territory could also resolve Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. 

Unity within NATO

Russia’s communications exaggerate differences in the foreign policy approaches of Europe and the United States. The strategic objective of Russia’s information influence activities is to weaken its opponents’ alliances. At the same time, Russia has been unable to maintain strong relations with its allies. 

This cynical reaction to conflicts between Western countries reflects Russia’s mistrust of its own partners. However, there have always been internal conflicts within NATO, and these have been resolved. How Russia will continue to exploit foreign policy differences between the United States and Europe in its information influence activities remains a key question. 

Disinformation about NATO presence

It is still possible that disinformation or misleading claims may be spread about Finland’s NATO policy or about NATO forces or structures in Finland. This has previously happened in the Baltic States, for example.

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