Prime Minister Vanhanen's speech in the debate on the Security and Defence Policy report in Parliament
Mr. Speaker,
The Government presented its report on Finnish Security and Defence Policy to Parliament at the end of September. The report has been given a thorough examination in committee, and the Government can concur with the main points of the commentary drawn up by the Parliamentary Defence Committee. The report has made rapid progress in Parliament, for which the Government is grateful.
Mr. Speaker,
Military non-alignment remains Finland's defence solution. Once again there is good reason to emphasize that military non-alignment defines the way we organize our defence. It is in this context that the concept appears in the Security and Defence Policy report. It does not describe our foreign policy. From the very start of our membership, we have been in a political alliance with the European Union. Thus we are not neutral, neither are we uncommitted. We consider it important that the EU develops as astrong security community which is able to influence the problems that have a major impact on the security of Finland and the Finnish people - terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, environmental problems, instability on our continent and in our neighbouring areas, and global problems. At the same time, everyone knows that the EU is not a military alliance responsible for the defence of the territory of its members.
As far as territorial defence is concerned, we have built up our national defence without membership of NATO. We defend the whole of our territory independently. The Government considers it important that applying for membership of NATO remain a real possibility for Finland should we decide that membership in this military alliance would be to Finland's advantage. The important thing is to ensure that no practical obstacles to this membership option emerge. We therefore want to ensure the capability of our Defence Forces to operate according to NATO standards, which are also the standards used by the EU.
Our policy on NATO membership is in itself clear, yet the Security and Defence Policy report has inspired lively debate on the question of how we define it: is it a possibility, an alternative or an option? This debate has acquired features that would put kremlinologists and scholastics of old to shame. All kinds of experts have been putting forward etymological assessments of whether our relationship with NATO has changed or remains the same. This has repeatedly escalated into hair-splitting of the worst possible kind. Liturgical quibbles tend to stifle genuine political debate. We do not need to talk about NATO membership in euphemisms. If our approach changes, the Government will publicize it in no uncertain terms. I hope that others will do the same. Those who are in favour of NATO membership may say so quite freely and even put forward proposals on the matter - virtual shadow-boxing, where differences in ways of thinking have to be interpreted on the basis of signs and symbols, is something we can do without.
Applying for NATO membership is amongst its supporters a bit like Lord Voldemort in the Harry Potter books. While the Government has read the Potter books, it does not use them as a source of doctrine. NATO membership does not require the sort of reticence in conversation that we find in talking about You-Know-Who. This is something that must be addressed by its proper name.
I have tried to crack the code myself, but I have not really been able to decide who are the more inclined towards NATO membership, those who talk about 'possibility' or those who talk about 'alternative'. Many people have decided perhaps that 'alternative' is the one that goes further, but I cannot tell. I find myself somewhat estranged from the word 'alternative' for describing our relationship with NATO. In my view, it gives the false impression that NATO membership would replace our own defence and all the developments described in this report. Military alliance does not mean that somebody else is going to come and take care of things on our behalf. Finland would need to have a strong defence capability in all situations even under NATO membership. On the other hand, the 'possibility' of NATO membership is precisely equivalent to the dictionary definition of the term.
I would also like to say that nothing would give a more uncertain and vacillating picture of Finland's policy than that we should define our defence approach in a way that conceals in its shades of meaning hidden references to change. It would be a matter of drifting without a set course. The old would be gone, but there would be nothing tangible in its place.
Mr. Speaker,
Russia does not require euphemisms either. Russia should be dealt with openly and without hangups. It is clear that our defence should be scaled according to our neighbouring areas, and Russia has considerable military potential. We do not believe that it is ranged against us. Neither do we take the view that the Russian leadership has any intention of using it against us. Defence, however, is not just a matter of being prepared for probable threats; the issues have to be considered against a background of all possible chains of events. If the capability for the use of military force exists in our immediate vicinity, we also have to be prepared for it in our defence plans. Sound foreign policy and the build up of the kind of cooperation from which everyone benefits will remain the principal way of increasing stability in our environment in the future. Security should never be built on weapons alone.
In a country like Finland, maintaining an efficient defence calls for the whole of society to be capable of mobilization in an emergency. That is why we need general conscription, effective territorial defence, adequate equipment and a strong will to defend ourselves.
Mr. Speaker,
Through this report, we have made progress in many important areas. One of these is Finland's policy on mines, and I can say with some satisfaction that the Defence Committee's commentary backs up the Government's approach. In this context, I should like to point out the obvious fact that no government starts out with a clean slate. It continues what previous governments and parliaments have decided. This applies to the policy on mines too.
Previous governments - governments of which the National Coalition Party (conservative) has been a part - have taken a number of decisions to the effect that obsolescent anti-personnel mines should not be replaced with new mines and have made a commitment to accede to the Ottawa Treaty. In the previous Government Report on Security and Defence Policy, in which the National Coalition Party was involved, the deadline for this was, very ambitiously, set at 2006. It is self-evident that we have had to act within the spirit of these guidelines.
We cannot first proclaim one thing and then do something different. This is a matter not of image but of credibility. This Government has now redeemed promises made earlier, and we have been able to make a decision on the timetable for and manner of acceding to the Ottawa Treaty so as to secure Finland's continued defence capability. The solution was to extend the deadline so that it became feasible to implement. The process will now also be considerably less expensive than it would have been had we adhered to the 2006 deadline. I have nothing but praise for those National Coalition Party members of the Defence Committee who have listened to the experts, gone into the matter in detail and given their support to the Government proposal. As a member of the opposition during the last government's term of office, I myself approved the then government's target deadline of 2006. In dealing with issues like this, it is important to remain consistent; and if consistency is retained when moving from opposition to government, it would be reasonable to hope that consistency could be retained when moving the other way too, and indeed the members of the Committee have acted with just such a sense of responsibility.
Mr. Speaker,
The formation of the European Union battle groups has proceeded rapidly since the report was completed. The Government has taken the decision to take part in two groupings. Finland intends to take part in one with Sweden, Norway and hopefully Estonia, and in another with Germany and the Netherlands. The EU's rapid deployment capability should be in operational readiness in 2007, meaning that as a union we will have the capability to deploy around 3,000 men within 5-15 days, should the need arise.
The battle groups the important function of enabling us to intervene in a crisis at a sufficiently early stage. Experience shows that many crisis situations would never have escalated into serious situations with heavy casualties if the international community had been able to intervene at an early stage. A military presence by the international community is the best guarantee of preventing genocide. This is in accordance with the key principles of the international system: the use of force is justified in defending those who are in the weakest position of all.
We are not embarking on this lightly. Because of the speed of deployment, the troops will be going into situations which may be unpredictable. Thus, the battle groups will be adequately prepared, and they will be appropriately equipped. A proper risk analysis will be carried out as the basis for decision-making on each operation, as has been done to date. Nevertheless, crisis management is never without its risks. Some of our peacekeepers have come home in caskets. Crisis management prevents atrocities, and at the same time everything is done to ensure that the peacekeepers themselves are protected.
The battle groups are designed for crisis management. They will be equipped with sufficient operational capability to be able to stabilize the situation even in the most difficult conditions, as are our present crisis management troops. Sufficient weaponry usually ensures that force does not have to be used. The battle groups will not be toothless. For the sake of clarity, it must be said that the equipment of the battle groups will not differ in quality and firepower from that of the 60 000 soldiers in the present EU crisis management groups - the essential difference is their state of readiness and a capability for self-deployment in the field in the middle of a crisis.
In public debate - perhaps because of the warlike term 'battle groups' - it has been claimed from time to time that these EU battle groups will form the kernel of some common defence which would be available to support the territorial defence of the Member States. Another, equally hollow claim is that the battle groups would form some sort of intervention troops that the EU could use to challenge the great powers in their own backyards. That is not the case at all. As it is intended that only two of the battle groups will be on duty alternately, it is quite obvious that this force of some three thousand men could not defend, let alone conquer, large tracts of land.
Nor, in fact, are they equipped for any such thing. If you compare a typical EU battle group with let us say a Finnish readiness brigade, the differences are considerable - the readiness brigade has heavier equipment, for example battle tanks, and they operate as part of a large striking force.
The Defence Committee's commentary has hit the nail on the head - 'battle group' is a military technical term indicating the size of the detachment, not its purpose. The EU's individual battle groups are intended to stabilize crisis situations independently, in preparation for other assistance and crisis management. The battle groups are intended for situations which at their most typical are marked by hostility or political unrest between national groups. Their equipment is also designed for such situations. The battle groups will be on UN business. This is the sort of sense of responsibility that the UN expects from its members.
It has to be said that the image given by television news broadcasting, for example, of crisis management is extremely war-like. When crisis management is discussed, there are always images of masked infantrymen attacking practice targets and firing at them in the background. This gives a rather one-sided picture. The daily routine of crisis management is quite different. In addition to protection, our soldiers help the civilian population to build a better everyday life. They are very good at this, and our conscript army has ensured that there are volunteers in crisis management tasks who come from all walks of civilian life. What they should be showing are pictures from Kosovo, where it has been possible to protect the weak and support rebuilding in difficult conditions.
Mr. Speaker,
The Government report states that the Peacekeeping Act should be reassessed to determine whether it is up to date. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has set up a working group for this purpose, which is to complete its work in May. The Government will evaluate the necessity of changing the Peacekeeping Act once this work has been completed. I have already said that as far as I am concerned, in amending the Peacekeeping Act we should consider for example whether operations should be permissible on the basis of EU decisions alone. We respect UN principles in our operations and support its purpose. In these matters, too, the Defence Committee commentary provides a sound basis for considering the issue.
Taking part in battle groups undeniably puts pressure on our own decision-making procedures. Particular precision is needed when Finland is taking its turn on duty with its companions in arms. The assumption then is that our troops are ready for rapid deployment once the Council of the European Union has made a unanimous decision. As far as our troops are concerned, formal decision-making of course remains on the national level - the Government, the President of the Republic and Parliament - in the form laid down in the Peacekeeping Act. However, the de facto moment of decision is in the Council of the European Union - if the operation is approved, our partners have to be able to rely on the fact that our troops who are doing a tour of duty are also given permission to go into action by the national leadership.
Decision-making situations must be carefully charted. It is important that we create a system in which the decision-makers intended in the Peacekeeping Act - the Government, the President of the Republic and Parliament - are properly involved in making the political decision before the critical discussion takes place in the Council. There has to be a transparent system for this. We know the risks of crisis management, and for that very reason it is important that the decision to deploy our troops should receive widespread support. We do not propose to deploy our men and women in difficult and demanding tasks on flimsy justification, now or in the future.
Mr. Speaker,
Rapid progress has been made in the military development of the European Union. It is perfectly natural that in a post-Cold-War world the EU should aim for a major role, not only in external affairs, security policy and crisis management but also in defence issues. The Government supports this development. It is our conviction that we must build a workable European Union. A workable European Union is not a challenge to the Transatlantic Alliance but is based on equal partnership. Europe and the United States are linked by a solid basis of shared values, and there must be cooperation between the two.
In defence matters, there is every reason to be precise about concepts. When we talk in the EU about 'defence' and 'defence cooperation' we do not mean 'territorial defence'. Only 'common defence' has this meaning. I do not consider it impossible that at some stage the EU may have a 'common defence'. There is a clear procedure for creating it. It would be possible to switch over to common defence by a unanimous decision of the European Council coupled with the national decisions the issue would require. This possibility - which would be approved by Finland too - has been in existence since the Treaty of Amsterdam. The battle groups are not the basis on which such a common defence could be built up. When the decision is made - if it ever is made - it will be a separate decision of its own. There is no need to be afraid that someone is going to smuggle the idea part us by stealth. In the event that the EU decides at some point in the future on common defence, then the EU would turn into a military alliance. However, the Transatlantic Alliance has been of major importance to European security and stability, and the military might of the United States has had a major role to play in this. I see no sense in breaking up this stability, and it behoves one to remember that, for example in the negotiations over the EU constitutional treaty in the IGC, not one government brought up the issue of switching over to a common defence.
Mr. Speaker,
There is still a place for the procedure that exists of reporting on Finland's security and defence policy. It is important that the principles of security and defence policy are regularly put before Parliament for its consideration on the basis of comprehensive preparation. Defence, in particular, is a ship that is slow to change course and involves plans and procurements that call for long-term, broad-based commitment. It is evident that the procedure can be developed further, and the Committee's views provide a valuable basis for this.
There has been a desire to outline plans for the structure of the Defence Forces - garrisons and depots - as an entirety. It is natural that in this we shall be operating in the new way contained in the report - through the report, Parliament will be given a good grasp of the plans of the defence administration, but individual decisions will be made at the operational level. It is clear that the structure of the Defence Forces must be made more efficient as age groups become smaller. The idea with this new procedure was to ensure that the defence administration would be able to take the necessary decisions, even though they may be difficult ones.
Finland's activities have been outlined in the report against an operational environment that is a good deal clearer than before. To my mind, it is quite clear that future Defence and Security Policy reports will continue this comprehensive approach.
Mr. Speaker,
I have in my hand a comprehensive report which outlines Finland's line of action in both external and internal security matters. Security is indivisible, and the threats to it are more complex than ever before. I have focused in my speech on certain individual issues, but it is worth pointing out yet again the fact that international cooperation is still a most important instrument in managing our security. We are not prepared to wait until threats materialize at our doorstep; we want to prevent their appearance well in advance. For this reason, I have tried to highlight in various speeches - both in this house and outside - the fact that foreign policy is the vanguard of our security.